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Abstract
Coastal zone regulation and policy in South Carolina had three distinct phases
between 1972 and 1993. Each was a result of choices based on state conditions and did
not indicate an inherent route, as revealed through a comparison to North Carolina. The
strongest period of regulation was a response to worsening erosion and to changes in
scientific knowledge. While likely the best course of action for the coast when
considered over time, this regulation was defeated by competing concerns, particularly
private property rights, that emerged after Hurricane Hugo and litigation related to the
regulation. South Carolina’s foray into coastal zone management illustrates the difficulty
of formulating and implementing effective environmental regulation and shows the
complexity of factors that affect the success of a regulatory program. The state’s coastal
zone regulation program, which declined based on the disapproving response of many
citizens and subsequently legislators, can be deemed unsuccessful. While the legislature
tried to protect the state’s economy by protecting the beaches, it did not take into account
the economic consequences to individuals. The malfunction of the regulatory process in
this setting indicates that people support regulation, or are at least ambivalent about it,
until they are directly affected by it in a way that they perceive as negative. Regulation
for private citizens, as opposed to corporations, must take into account that individuals
have not been exposed to the regulatory process and are not accustomed to regulation
generally. As a result, they may rebel against the regulation via their voting power.
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Introduction
“The edge of the sea is a strange and beautiful place. All through the long history
of Earth it has been an area of unrest where waves have broken heavily against
the land, where the tides have pressed forward over the continents, receded, and
then returned. For no two successive days is the shore line precisely the same.”
--Rachel Carson
The Edge of the Sea

Land located near the ocean is some of the most valuable property within the
United States. However, development within these areas can be harmful in numerous
ways and for several reasons. First, the coast is subject to unique and dynamic natural
processes that can endanger both development and human life. Unwise siting and
development decisions can exacerbate these processes. Imprudent and ill-advised
development and positioning of homes and businesses may also impede or otherwise
harm less aggressive natural processes (such as tides) that can damage ecosystems and
valuable natural resources. The coastal zone is highly sought after for its scenic value
and recreational values, yet it is small in area compared to the number of people who
seek to make use of it. It can be made even smaller by private property owners who seek
exclusivity of its use. In South Carolina, coastal real estate is expensive and highly
desired. It provides a large portion of South Carolina’s economy and is home to a
considerable amount of its population. The regulation of land near the ocean in South
Carolina is highly contentious and has gone through several periods of change beginning
in the 1970s.

1

The South Carolina Coast Before 1970
Historically, development along the South Carolina coast was governed by the
risk associated with construction. Only people who could afford to shoulder the risk
themselves built along the coast. Most of the structures built in the coastal zone,
particularly on the barrier islands of the Atlantic Ocean, were owned by the rich. By the
end of the eighteenth century, South Carolina planters were erecting summer beach
cottages, and Pawley’s Island (located just off the coast between Murrell’s Inlet and Mt.
Pleasant) was particularly popular. Wealthy planters sought relief from the hot and
humid summer climate at these new retreats. Near Charleston, well-to-do residents began
to build cottages on Sullivan’s Island in the early 1800s. By 1824, the island had a
summer population of approximately one thousand.1
Until the mid-twentieth century, coastal building was almost exclusively an
activity of the wealthy because of the risks associated with it. Prior to the passage of the
National Flood Insurance Program of 1968, few insurance companies would insure
oceanfront buildings, and few banks would grant mortgages for oceanfront buildings, at
least without other collateral. As a result, most construction in the coastal zone was done
by the well-to-do, reflecting an awareness of the risks and costs of building there. When
federal insurance became available for these structures, they began multiplying, as
individuals were no longer required to incur all the risks of shoreline ownership

1

James B. London and others, A Study of Shore Erosion Management Issues and Options in South
Carolina (Charleston: South Carolina Sea Grant Consortium, 1981), 39.
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themselves.2 This legislation encouraged those who may not have been wealthy enough
to self-insure to build homes near the ocean.
During the 1960s and 1970s, coastal development increased tremendously in
South Carolina, particularly in Horry County. Horry County is the northern-most coastal
county in South Carolina and is also the largest county in the state. Myrtle Beach, a
sizeable tourist area, is located in Horry County. There were no restrictions or
regulations in place during this period of large-scale growth on where one could develop,
including the beaches or dunes. South Carolina did not regulate oceanfront building
before 1977, and since natural erosion at that point only averaged about one foot per year,
there appeared to be few erosion-related problems associated with development, even
fairly close to the shore.3
Over time, population growth and its accompanying development increased and
put immense pressure on the resources and ecosystems of the coast.4 Coastal
development harmed the habitats of fish and coastal wildlife. Construction in the coastal
zone also altered natural processes and their resulting impacts.5 Housing developments
and other building required new and larger infrastructures (such as roads, utilities and
2

G.S. Kleppel and others, “Trends in Land Use Policy and Development in the Coastal Southeast,” in
Changing Land Use Patterns in the Coastal Zone: Managing Environmental Quality in Rapidly Developing
Regions, ed. G.S. Kleppel, M. Richard DeVoe and Mac V. Dawson (New York: Springer, 2006), 28. The
National Flood Insurance Act is codified at 42 U.S.C. 4001 et seq.
3
Timothy W. Kana, Beach Erosion in South Carolina (Charleston: South Carolina Sea Grant Consortium,
1988), 28.
4
“The most important factor in the decline of environmental conditions within the coastal zone has been
the unprecedented increase in human population growth, particularly in the southeastern United States.”
Geoffrey I. Scott, A. Frederick Holland, and Paul A. Sandifer, “Afterword: Managing Coastal Urbanization
and Development in the Twenty-First Century: The Need for a New Paradigm,” Changing Land Use
Patterns in the Coastal Zone: Managing Environmental Quality in Rapidly Developing Regions, ed. G.S.
Kleppel, M. Richard DeVoe and Mac V. Dawson (New York: Springer, 2006), 285-299, 285.
5
Orrin H. Pilkey and others, The North Carolina Shore and Its Barrier Islands: Restless Ribbons of Sand
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1998), 37.
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schools), the construction or improvement of which further harmed the sensitive
ecosystems and processes. For these reasons, population growth near the coast has
become a concern.
The numbers associated with this growth are informative. The total population of
the coastal counties of the southeastern region of the United States rose by sixty-four
percent between 1970 and 1990.6 During the latter decade, the greatest population
increases on the east coast took place in Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia and Florida.7 The Census Bureau has predicted that approximately eleven
million people will move to the North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia between
1995 and 2025, and between fifty and seventy-five percent of them will reside on the
coastal plains of this three state region.8 Between 1990 and 2000, the population of
South Carolina’s coastal counties increased from 833,519 to 981,338, a 17.73 percent
increase.9 There has been change over time in terms of the population of the coastal zone
that increased dramatically in the mid-twentieth century. Before the twentieth century,
development near the coast was not seen as a problem, both because it was scarce and
because there was little in terms of scientific knowledge to indicate that it might become
a problem. This twentieth-century development exacerbated natural conditions and
resulted in problems such as erosion.
6

M. Richard DeVoe and G.S. Kleppel, “Introduction—The Effects of Changing Land Use Patterns on
Marine Resources: Setting a Research Agenda to Facilitate Management,” Changing Land Use Patterns in
the Coastal Zone: Managing Environmental Quality in Rapidly Developing Regions, ed. G.S. Kleppel, M.
Richard DeVoe and Mac V. Dawson (New York: Springer, 2006), 1-19, 3.
7
F. John Vernberg and Winona Vernberg, The Coastal Zone: Past, Present, and Future (Columbia:
University of South Carolina Press, 2001), 62.
8
Kleppel and others, “Trends in Land Use Policy,”23-45, 26.
9
Timothy Beatley, David J. Brower and Anna K. Schwab, An Introduction to Coastal Zone Management,
2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 2002), 56.
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In addition to the dramatic increase in population, day and overnight visitors to
the coastal zone increased in the mid to late twentieth century, particularly in South
Carolina. The total of the permanent population and the visitor population is referred to
as the “peak population.” In the coming years, the peak population of east coast coastal
zone areas is expected to increase even more.10 During this period of growth, visitors to
the coastal zone, particularly in the greater Myrtle Beach area, often sought
accommodations and attractions on or near the shoreline, one of the most ecologically
sensitive and easily damaged areas of the coastal zone. As a result, hotel construction
near the beach grew dramatically.
South Carolina’s coastal zone is significant. It measures approximately 8,116
square miles, including about 500,000 acres of coastal marshes (335,000 of which are
classified as salt marsh), 35,000 acres of brackish water, 65,000 acres of freshwater
marsh, 40 barrier islands and 3 million acres of forested lands. The coastal zone
comprises about 23% of state’s land area. In the 1970s, it contained 21% of state’s
population, 18% of the state’s labor force and 16% of the state’s unemployment. The
most important economic sectors as of 1970 in South Carolina’s coastal zone were
agriculture, forestry, fisheries, recreation and tourism, government and limited industry.11
The South Carolina coastal zone consists of eight counties and includes both their
lands and waters: Beaufort, Berkeley, Charleston, Colleton, Dorchester, Georgetown,
Horry and Jasper. Additionally, the South Carolina Coastal Management Act specified
10

Vernberg and Vernberg, The Coastal Zone, 65.
Office of Coastal Zone Management, National Ocean and Atmospheric Administration and South
Carolina Coastal Council, Final Environmental Impact Statement of the Proposed Coastal Management
Program for the State of South Carolina (Washington: US Dept. of Commerce, 1979), pt. 3, 1-4.
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that the coastal zone was to include the coastal waters and submerged lands seaward to
the State’s jurisdictional limits.12 South Carolina’s coastline is complex and irregular,
broken up by numerous tidal inlets, with beaches facing more than one direction. (This is
in contrast to the relatively straight Atlantic shorelines of North Carolina and Florida.)13
Figure One14
The South Carolina Coastal Zone

The lighter shading indicates the coastal zone. The darker shading indicates the areas of the coastal zone
that have been designated critical areas under the Beachfront Management Act, an amended form of the
South Carolina Coastal Management Act.

Generally, South Carolina beaches are wider than the beaches of the other
Atlantic coast states.15 Another general trend in South Carolina is sand movement. Most
12

South Carolina Coastal Council, Legal Analysis and Goals and Objectives of the South Carolina Coastal
Management Program, Draft Report no. 2 (South Carolina Coastal Council: February, 1978), 13.
13
Kana, Beach Erosion in South Carolina, 13. The opposite of erosion is accretion. This is the process of
increasing the surface area of a beach through the natural transfer of sand from another area. Interestingly,
the South Carolina Coastal Zone Management Act, originally and as amended, provides that accreted land
automatically becomes the property of the State: “…no person or governmental agency may develop ocean
front property accreted by natural forces or as the result of permitted or non-permitted structures beyond
the mean high water mark as it existed at the time the ocean front property was initially developed or
subdivided, and such property shall remain the property of the State held in trust for the people of the
State.”13 From a practical standpoint, this would obviously be a difficult provision to enforce, at least until
the accretion became substantial.
14
Figure One is taken from the website for the Department of Health and Environmental Control,
http://www.scdhec.net/environment/ocrm/ (accessed on August 9, 2007).
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of South Carolina’s inlets seem to depend on a persistent source of sand from beaches to
the north to feed the inlet system, indicating a trend that sand shifts southward because of
wind and waves. The shape of South Carolina’s barrier islands offers evidence of this
trend: the northern ends of the islands are commonly wider than the southern ends. This
means that some beaches are more secure or “healthy” than others because of where they
are positioned in relation to their supply of incoming sand.16 On the other side of the
coin, however, are the beaches from which the sand is moving. These beaches are
experiencing erosion at a higher rate.17 Of the thirty states in the United States with a
coastline, all experience localized erosion.18 Some figures put the total of open shoreline
that is retreating in a landward direction in the continental United States at between
eighty and ninety percent.19 In sum, South Carolina’s coast is a multifaceted, convoluted
group of parts, each experiencing its own responses to natural and human-made stimuli.
Some parts appear to be healthy as to the problems associated with erosion, while others
seem to be melting away more quickly. The factor that can make all the degrees of
erosion appear relevant is coastal development.
Coastal regions are affected by, and in point of fact are constantly being altered
by, both natural and human impacts. Changes in the shoreline are natural and would
occur if humans were not present. The coast is transient, and its ordinary conduct and
natural cycles include both erosion and accretion. Without human activity and

15

London and others, A Study of Shore Erosion, 19.
Kana, Beach Erosion in South Carolina, 19-21.
17
Kana, Beach Erosion in South Carolina, 22.
18
Beatley, Brower and Schwab, An Introduction to Coastal Zone Management, 43.
19
Pilkey and others, The North Carolina Shore, 87.
16
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development in the coastal zone, these activities would occur without concern.20 Human
activities in the coastal zone have had, and continue to have, dramatic effects on the
coastal zone, particularly on the rate of shoreline erosion. Despite some of the recent
efforts of society, these activities have been primarily negative and have almost always
increased the rate of shoreline erosion. Table One lists many of both the natural and
artificial forces that perpetuate erosion in the coastal zone.
Table One21
Factors Affecting Shoreline Erosion
Natural Factors
Man-Made Factors
Breaking Waves
Dams on Rivers
Winds
Shorefront Development
Currents
Seawalls
Rain
Groins and breakwaters
Sediment supply
Harbor jetties
Tidal cycle
Offshore dredging
Storm frequency
Beach sand mining
Sea-level rise
Boat wakes
Near shore bathymetry
Farm practices
Regional geology
Surface water runoff
Biogenic process (reef building, burrowing
by organisms, etc.)

While most of these factors are in play in nearly all coastal communities, some
are more influential than others in South Carolina. Of the natural processes, breaking
waves and storm frequency are prevalent in the Palmetto State. Of the human-caused
factors, shorefront development, particularly in Horry County and on the barrier islands,

20

Peter W. French, Coastal Defences: Process, Problems and Solutions (London: Routledge, 2001), 19-20.
Kana, Beach Erosion in South Carolina, 10. When considered in the whole of geologic time, South
Carolina’s coast has been building, not eroding, through the sediment buildup resulting from the erosion of
the Appalachian Mountains. As a result, much of the state’s coast is quite young from the standpoint of
geologic time. The barrier islands, for example, are only about four thousand years old.
21
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and erosion-control devices, particularly seawalls and groins, have been the cause of a
large extent of the erosion along the South Carolina coast.
Erosion can be classified depending on how immediate the danger is to the
coastline and to the accompanying structures. (Erosion is the landward dislocation of the
shoreline. When beach erodes, sand located there is moved into the ocean and away from
the shoreline.)22 An area likely to suffer from imminent erosion is subject to an erosion
hazard within ten years. What this means is that within a decade the beach in front of the
area could be gone due to erosion. In terms of buildings, land underneath the structure
could be damaged by erosion within ten years or even that the water could touch the
structure within ten years. The worst case scenario in this category is that the beach and
the land under the structure’s foundation could completely erode within a decade, leaving
the structure to fall into the water. The next most dangerous category is intermediate. An
area subject to an intermediate hazard may be subject to erosion hazards within thirty
years. Finally, an area subject to long-term erosion hazards will likely be safe from
erosion for sixty years or more.23 The least wise decision would be to improve land
within an imminent erosion hazard zone. Development within the intermediate hazard
zone is likely acceptable, though smaller, moveable structures would be preferable.
Development within the long-term erosion hazard zone would be preferable, both for the
health of the shoreline and coastal zone as well as for the monetary stake of the
landowner or developer. Most people do not consider erosion a serious natural hazard, as
22

Beatley, Brower and Schwab, An Introduction to Coastal Zone Management, 43. Erosion is much more
common than accretion, which is the increase of coastal land based on the deposit of sand or other
sediment.
23
National Research Council, Managing Coastal Erosion (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press,
1990), 7.
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it poses no direct threat to human life and is only noticeable over time.24 Nevertheless, it
can be responsible for partial or complete loss in terms of property value and is therefore
a contentious legal issue that emerges repeatedly in coastal zone management.
There are three basic responses to erosion along the coast when development is
already present: do nothing, renourish the beaches (by moving sand from another location
to the beach to build it up) or “armor” the beaches via erosion-control devices. While
beach renourishment is preferable to erosion-control devices, it is not a perfect solution.
Renourishment is preferable in that it allows maintenance of natural coastal processes
while still providing increased levels of coastal protection. For this reason, it is
sometimes called “an imitation of nature.”25 It can also be discontinued if determined to
be ineffective, without the problems of deteriorating structures or structure removal that
would be associated with hard defenses.26 However, renourishment must be repeated,
sometimes indefinitely, to be effective, since the beach is not being allowed to function
naturally. This can be extremely costly. In addition to the expense of repeating the
process indefinitely, there is a need for a source site for the harvest of renourishment
materials. The borrow site must have sand that is similar to the renourishment location
for the process to be most effective. Borrow sites can become environmentally unstable
themselves if over-harvested for renourishment materials.27 Nevertheless, because of the

24

Owen J. Furuseth and Sallie M. Ives, “Individual Attitudes Toward Coastal Erosion Policies: Carolina
Beach, North Carolina,” in Cities on the Beach: Management Issues of Developed Coastal Barriers, ed.
Rutherford H. Platt, Sheila G. Pelczarski and Barbara K.R. Burbank (Chicago: The University of Chicago
Department of Geography, 1987), 185-196, 185.
25
London and others, A Study of Shore Erosion, 27.
26
London and others, A Study of Shore Erosion, 29.
27
London and others, A Study of Shore Erosion, 28.
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value of property in many coastal areas, some renourishment is often viewed as
absolutely necessary.28
In addition to renourishment, other options exist for defense. Coastal defense
mechanisms are generally classified as either soft (such as beach renourishment) or hard
(erosion control devices or structures). Hard defenses include any structure that provides
a solid barrier between the land and the ocean so as to resist the energy of the waves.
This classification of defense would include seawalls, bulkheads, revetments, groins and
jetties. Seawalls are large structures designed to provide a permanent separation between
land and water; seawalls are used to protect against direct wave action. Bulkheads are
used primarily to protect fill located landward of their location and to provide protection
from small waves. Revetments are lighter structures used to armor the dune slope; they
are often made of a more flexible material such as rubble. Groins are long narrow
structures that run perpendicular to the shoreline and into the water and are designed to
trap moving sand. Jetties extend into the water as groins do, but they are used to control
inlet areas, as opposed to beach areas.29 The selection of an erosion-control device is
dependent upon the dynamics of the area. These devices may also be used in
combination with one another or in combination with beach renourishment.30 These
structures prevent natural coastal processes from operating and result in a series of
impacts on the natural environment.31 Erosion-control devices have been a controversial
issue because of their effects. While some types protect the subject structures that have
28

French, Coastal Defences, 213-14.
London and others, A Study of Shore Erosion, 29-34.
30
London and others, A Study of Shore Erosion, 35-6.
31
French, Coastal Defences, 47.
29
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been created to shield, they may also result in continued shoreline retreat and beach
loss.32
Erosion-control devices have been employed both by private landowners and by
state governments in attempts to stop landward movement of the shoreline. In South
Carolina, most of these structures were put into place by private property owners or
groups of private property owners (such as homeowners associations). Many were
erected in the 1970s or before. Coastal geologist Peter French has noted that hard
defense historically remained a response to erosion control in many situations for several
reasons. First, hard defenses were traditional in many areas. People often felt more
secure behind a seawall than behind a built up beach, even if the degree of protection
offered was similar. The value of the land in question was often high, leading people to
prefer a proactive method of defense.33 It is important to note, however, that erosion
control devices were and are designed to protect property and not beaches. Beaches,
even if moving landward, would always be present if left alone. These devices are not
beach-saving techniques, but rather beach-diminishing devices. Their sole goal is to
preserve private property that lies landward of the beach.34
Another circumstance which contributes to coastal defense is the existence and
condition of sand dunes. Dunes can be thought of as natural sea walls, serving as a barrier
between ocean and land. South Carolina’s shoreline is fairly well-armed with dunes,
32

As coastal zone management specialist Timothy Beatley has indicated, there was a growing recognition
in the early 1990s that attempts to fortify the coastline are largely futile, as well as being damaging to the
environment. Timothy Beatley, “Hurricane Hugo and Shoreline Retreat: Evaluating the Effectiveness of the
South Carolina Beachfront Management Act” (working paper, University of Virginia, September 1992), 1.
33
Ibid.,
34
Cornelia Dean, Against the Tide: The Battle for America’s Beaches (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1999), 16.
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which average roughly four feet in height in developed areas and are usually covered, at
least partially, with sea oats or other vegetation. While highly fragile, dunes play a
significant role in the stability of both the beaches that front them and the land behind
them. Like the shoreline, dunes are dynamic landforms. They are able to supply sand to
the beach when it is needed and store it when it is not needed.35 Dunes are essential to
both the natural processes at work in the shoreline area, as well as serving as a line of
defense for any structures that may lie landward of the dune. When dunes and dune
vegetation are altered by human activities, their protective value can be lessened or lost.
A dune can be harmed if a structure is placed directly upon it, but it can also be damaged
if a structure is built nearby, as beachfront development generally leads to the destruction
of dune vegetation and the slow movement of dune sand via human activities near or one
the dunes. Dunes are easily destabilized. There are several means of dune stabilization,
including employing sand fences, planting vegetation (such as sea oats), and posting
signs requesting that visitors stay off of dunes and/or that visitors do not remove or
damage vegetation.36 Unlike erosion-control devices, however, dunes harm neither their
adjacent beaches nor beaches downdrift.
In the 1970s, coastal zone management became more fully developed as a
science, and more research was done on the effects of hard defenses. By the early 1980s,
most experts agreed that the move away from erosion-control devices was the wellinformed and correct decision. The general reasoning for this decision was that while
they can protect structures near the shoreline from waves if they are properly designed
35
36

French, Coastal Defences, 218-19.
Vernberg and Vernberg, The Coastal Zone, 116-118.
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and constructed, seawalls almost always result in the eventual loss of the recreational
beach. Seawalls can degrade beaches in three ways: passive loss (waves crash against the
wall and the offshore slope is steepened), placement loss (the seawall is built seaward of
the high tide line, removing all or part of the beach when the wall is constructed) and
active loss (the rate of beach loss is enhanced through the interaction of the wall and
storms).37 Most of the time, the problems caused by these structures are reflected in the
downdrift beaches, which experience more severe erosion than they would have
otherwise. These adjacent beaches often bear the brunt of the reduction of the natural
processes.38
The specific regulatory provisions considered for the coastal zone depended upon
the unique attributes that the subject section possesses. Each Atlantic coast state has a
distinctive coastal zone that requires understanding for a proper recommendation and
enactment of coastal zone management policy. The marine environment generally is
composed of three zones: coastal zone, continental shelf and open ocean.39 South
Carolina’s shoreline and coastal zone are markedly different from those of its northern
coastal neighbor, North Carolina, and its southern coastal neighbor, Georgia. The state of
South Carolina has 198 miles of ocean coastline. This stretch is frequently divided into
three zones: 1) Grand Strand—from Little River Inlet to Winyah Bay, 2) Santee Delta
and 3) approximately 100 miles of barrier and sea islands.40

37

Pilkey and others, The North Carolina Shore, 91.
National Research Council, Managing Coastal Erosion, 35.
39
Scott, Holland and Sandifer, “Managing Coastal Urbanization and Development,” 285.
40
Rutherford H. Platt and others, Coastal Erosion: Has Retreat Sounded? Program on Environment and
Behavior, Monograph No. 53 (Boulder: Institute of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado: 1992).
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Particular risk is affixed to development along the shoreline. Structures
developed close to the beach are in the path of storm-driven waves and are at the mercy
of erosion. Development on the coast is risky and tricky, yet it is thriving more than ever.
In the mid-twentieth century, coastal landowners and developers began swiftly
developing the coastal zone, and the pace has not slowed since. Unquestionably, these
human activities changed the natural processes at work in the coastal zone.
Development in the coastal zone, as anywhere else, is governed by policies that
manage and organize development. As Dennis Ducsik of the Massachusetts Office of
Coastal Zone Management has revealed, the federal and state governments have taken a
direct role in protecting the intangible assets and qualities of the coastal zone since the
1970s, as these types of values are not protected by market forces.41 As a result, the
amount of development in each state impacted how regulation in that state looked and
how successful it was. If there was little development, there was less protest. If there
was more development, as was the case in South Carolina, there was more protest.
As Timothy Kana, a coastal scientist and engineer, has observed, little attention is
paid to the natural ebb and flow of beach shifts in undeveloped areas.42 (About forty
percent, or over seventy miles, of South Carolina’s coastline is primitive and protected
from future development due to its legal status as a park, wildlife refuge or other
protected status.43 These areas are undeveloped.) In areas where structures exist,
however, even the smallest changes are observed and fretted over. Coastal real estate is a
41

Dennis W. Ducsik, Shoreline for the Public: A Handbook of Social, Economic, and Legal Considerations
Regarding Public Recreational Use of the Nation’s Coastal Shoreline (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1974), 209.
42
Kana, Beach Erosion in South Carolina, 27.
43
Kana, Beach Erosion in South Carolina, 32.
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big, expensive business. In many areas, coastal property doubles in value every five to
ten years, so “losing” a piece of it to the ocean, even if it is small, is a major concern to
land owners. Even so, property owners can also “lose” land, or certain uses of it, through
regulation. This is what occurred in South Carolina through the regulation of the coast.
Though the coastal property owners did not want their shoreline property to fall into the
ocean, they also wanted to be free to build large houses there.

The Coastal Zone Management Act and the Regulation of the South Carolina Coast
Coastal zone management is the attempt to control and manage human activities
so as to protect the natural resources of the coastal zone from humans and to likewise
protect humans from the hazards presented by the coastal zone.44 It is a relatively new
concept in terms of United States legal history that began with the federal Coastal Zone
Management Act enacted in 1972. This legislation was part of the flurry of federal
environmental legislation enacted in the early 1970s during the Richard Nixon
administration. The Coastal Zone Management Act encouraged states to develop
individualized coastal management programs and offered federal financial support if a
handful of requirements were met. Most Atlantic coast states responded to this offer of
federal support and quickly developed their own legislation and the structures necessary
to implement a coastal management program. Table Two indicates that federal monies
spent on state CZMA programs between 1972 and 2001. It indicates that CZMA

44

Beatley, Brower and Schwab, An Introduction to Coastal Zone Management, 13-14.
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expenditures were significant during this period, when many states were in organization
and start-up phases of the CZMA program.
Table Two45
Selected Coastal Program Expenditures (by the federal government),
Fiscal Years 1972-2001
CZMA Section
Expenditures (in millions of dollars)
305—Program Development
72.1
306—Program Administration
844.1
308—Coastal Zone Management Fund
10.9
309—Coastal Zone Enhancement
79.1
310—Research and Technical Assistance
4.9

South Carolina’s policy and legislation related to the coastal zone underwent
several key changes. The first, as aforementioned, was the passage of the state’s initial
coastal zone management legislation. This legislation came in direct response to passage
of the federal Coastal Zone Management Act, which was considered a necessary response
to coastal degradation. Before its initial legislation, South Carolina did not regulate
oceanfront construction, yet there was little opposition to this law. This statute was not
protested by the public for three reasons. First, the general climate of opinion during this
era was favorable toward environmental statutes, so protection of the coast seemed like a
good idea. Second, this law did not really impact anyone except that some people were
slightly inconvenienced by the permit process. Otherwise, the property owners who
already had houses or other structures in place were not affected, and development
continued to increase. Finally, it brought money into the state from the federal
government.
45
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The federal legislation was a reaction to the changing nature of society’s views as
to hazards posed to the natural environment and calls for federal intervention to preserve
and conserve the natural environment. The public became increasingly aware of
pollution and other dangers as a result of informative books, the development of ecology
as a field, high-profile environmental disasters, and activities of environmental
organizations that culminated in Earth Day in 1970. The second major change to South
Carolina’s coastal zone management policy occurred in response to a regarded failure of
the initial legislation regarding erosion and to the subsequent report of the Blue Ribbon
Committee. After the state’s preliminary policy and legislation had been in place for a
few years, it was evident that it had failed. Erosion, particularly, was still a big problem.
As a result, the Coastal Council (the state agency responsible for administering the state’s
coastal zone management policy and legislation) appointed a special committee to
determine what was wrong with the policy and legislation and how best to respond. This
committee released its report in 1987, citing the Coastal Council’s inadequate authority
as one of the biggest issues that needed to be corrected. The state’s legislation was then
amended in 1988. These amendments, known as the Beachfront Management Act
(BMA), gave the Coastal Council new powers and strengthened the state’s law for
protecting the coastal zone. The BMA affected only a few property owners (those who
had undeveloped lots) since most of the coast was already developed. As a result, there
was relatively little protest against the much stronger regulation.
Problems began to surface, however, in 1989, when the Coastal Council began to
enforce regulations regarding oceanfront development, particularly those that involved
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setbacks and reconstruction near the shoreline. These problems were exacerbated by
natural forces, especially hurricanes, and by resistance to Coastal Council decisions by
property owners. Property owners spoke up, loudly and often, and they complained to
their state legislators. As a result, the legislators felt pressured to change the law to
pacify their constituents. The next major changes to South Carolina coastal zone
management policy were directly precipitated by Hurricane Hugo in 1989 and by a battle
in the courts, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council. Numerous houses were
destroyed or severely damaged in Hugo, which brought the otherwise unconsidered
setback provisions into play for several property owners. These changes contrasted with
passage of the initial legislation and to the changes made in response to the Blue Ribbon
Committee’s Report in that they weakened the powers of the Coastal Council and
backtracked in terms of conservation of the coastal zone.

Literature Review
The CZMA sought to provide the coastal states a basis for regulating the activities
of human beings within the coastal zone. The study of a subject of this type brings into
play a number of disciplines. The study of regulation generally encompasses history,
political science and law. (Business historian Thomas McCraw has correctly noted that
in the case of economic regulation of business, a fourth discipline, economics, must be
included as well.)46 The study of a federal regulation with environmental implications,
such as the CZMA, may also encompass environmental science and/or ecology.
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Consideration of coastal zone management legislation and its effectiveness requires the
analysis of history and law, as well as the considerations of political science and ecology.
Several historians and other academics have considered why the study and
consideration of regulation may be relevant to legislators and others who influence
policy.

Understanding how and why coastal zone management legislation and policy

changed in South Carolina, particularly what factors influenced the changes and the
difficulty of pacifying adverse groups within society, may have applicability to other
contexts involving environmental regulation. A study of these policy and legislative
changes suggests that citizens can have an overpowering influence on how regulation is
written and that their concerns regarding other rights can overcome scientific advice and
recommendations.
Environmental regulation may be placed into a larger context of regulation
generally termed social regulation. (Social regulation usually concerns non-market
products of economic activity and is generally designed “‘to remedy the failure of the
private market to price adequately the negative externalities of many productive
practices…[which impose] economically unjustifiable costs on certain groups in the
population.’”)47 Regulations covering workplace safety or consumer safety are usually
identified as social regulation.48 Social regulation and reform have received considerable
academic attention, much of it pre-dating the social reform explosion of the 1960s and
1970s. As early as 1911, Frank Goodnow, a prominent early twentieth century political
47
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scientist, argued that the attitudes and opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court are the only
Constitutional obstacles to social reform and that the Constitution itself offers few
impediments to a substantial increase in government functions, both state and federal.49
This proved to be one of the obstacles to progressive coastal zone management reform in
South Carolina when Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council was decided.
Other scholars have studied and emphasized the early roots of social regulation in
the United States. Eugene Bardach and Robert Kagan, for example, illustrate that
protective social regulation dates back to colonial times, when many colonies, including
New York and Massachusetts, employed inspectors to protect the public from diseased or
fraudulent provisions or other goods.50 Similarly, political scientist David Vogel notes
that environmentally protective legislation was in place early in the twentieth century,
citing a 1906 statute banning the import of sponges from the Gulf of Mexico that were
harvested through methods that harmed these beds.51 Coastal zone management
legislation was a later arrival, first appearing as a part of federal law in the early 1970s.
Historians frequently divide the study of regulations into periods. Public policy
professor Marc Allen Eisner suggests that many varieties of regulation within a period
are linked by larger policy objectives. He believes that regulation generally has
undergone several significant shifts, which he refers to as “regulatory regimes,” including
a dramatic increase in social regulation in the 1960s and 1970s, a period which he refers
to as the “societal” regime. Eisner has argued that the study of regulation is valuable
49
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because it is helpful in recognizing the sources of contemporary policy debates.52 David
Vogel contended that the United States has gone through three periods of change as to
business-government relations in the twentieth century: Progressive Era, New Deal and
the 1960s-1970s era.53 The Progressive/New Deal/1960s-1970s breakdown is the one
most often used by historians of regulation. Vogel notes that the most recent era is
difficult to define as far as the boundary years, but he estimates that this era began about
1964 and ended in approximately 1977. Though he suggests that this era is more difficult
to set chronological boundaries upon, he concludes that it is the most distinctive era of
the three because it included greater political conflict over social regulation and because
of the increase in federal social control in both number of regulations/agencies and
degree of control.54 Political conflict was a condition suffered by coastal zone
management policymakers in South Carolina, but it did not end in 1977. It actually
intensified as changes were made to the law.
Public policy professor Cary Coglianese has asserted that laws and the reform of
laws have a certain role in social movement as instruments to bring about social change.
Law reform, therefore, is generally viewed a means of realizing the goal of social
change.55 Specifically, he argues that the environmental movement began to transform
law and society in the early 1970s. Coglianese refers to “dramatic changes” to American
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law that he dates to the signing of the National Environmental Policy Act on January 1,
1970. The Coastal Zone Management Act, enacted two years later, was part of this series
of changes. It motivated otherwise conservative and regulation-averse states, including
South Carolina, to police the use of their coastal zones. Before the enactment of their
coastal zone legislation in the late 1970s, there was no regulation of coastal zone use or
near-ocean construction in South Carolina. The only means of governance was common
sense.
Geologists Roger Charlier and Christian DeMeyer have argued that
environmental management programs are usually introduced by a government agency
reacting to resource degradation, exposure to major hazards, utilization conflict or the
need for social-economic development.56 This supposition fits well with the concept of
coastal zone management legislation, which is a response to two of these factors:
resource degradation and utilization conflict. As these authors note, the CZMA itself
reflected a national concern “to harmonize the demands of urbanization, recreation,
industry and energy development in the littoral fringe, and recognizes the incompatibility
of these uses.”57 In terms of the regulation of natural resources, Arthur McEvoy has
argued that it is the domain of public agencies to determine permissible levels of use or
harvest so as to regulate effective and efficient use while conserving the resource for
future use.58
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David Vogel has suggested that environmental regulation can be used to
generalize about the politics and administration of regulation generally, though he
acknowledges that environmental regulation in the United States is a politicized issue.59
When South Carolina’s coastal zone management legislation was amended following
Hurricane Hugo, it was a politicized issue based upon how the legislation would affect
the property rights of coastal landowners. Many of the legislators pushing for a weaker
version of the law represented residents of the coastal counties.
Another possibility is the use of environmental history as a form of advocacy.
Environmental historian Richard Andrews argues that historical context actively affects
environmental issues today. He specifically offers the example of wetlands protection in
the framework of years of federal policies and constitutional doctrines established over
time, both of which have proven difficult to overcome. Andrews contends that
understanding the history of American environmental policy is necessary to correct what
he views as existing problems. He suggests that persistent public support is necessary to
initiate and maintain government action and that both require knowledge of what has
been successful and what has not.60 This was the key weakness of the South Carolina’s
coastal zone management program. When initially introduced, it had public support. At
that juncture, the weak regulations introduced replaced nothing and, in response, the state
received federal money. The amendments to the program seemed good in theory, based
upon the idea that they would help decrease erosion. This change represented the policy
59

David Vogel, National Styles of Regulation: Environmental Policy in Great Britain and the United States
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), 24, 261.
60
Richard N.L. Andrews, Managing the Environment, Managing Ourselves: A History of American
Environmental Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999).

24

at its strongest point, both from a regulatory and a scientific standpoint. The full
regulatory implications of the amendments were not understood until after Hurricane
Hugo and the Lucas challenge. At that point, the regulations lost public support because
they adversely affected another group of rights—property rights. This group of rights
was viewed by many of the citizens as more important than the environmental protection
offered by the coastal zone management laws.
Historians and political scientists have analyzed specific regulations and why they
were deemed successes or failures. Samuel P. Hays, a historian who has written
extensively on environmental issues, maintains that analysis of this type can only be
deemed successful if it includes the circumstances surrounding the regulation, the groups
influenced by it and the ends which will be served through it.61 Similarly, Thomas
McCraw argues that successful and effective regulation of business must take the
economics of the situation into account.62 While McCraw applied this principle to the
regulation of businesses, it applies to the regulation of individuals as well. The laws
passed by the states under the CZMA, unlike other environmental statutes like the Clean
Air and Clean Water Acts, applied directly to individuals. In the case of South Carolina,
the legislature considered the economic objectives of the state as a whole when it devised
the subject regulation, but it did not consider the economic consequences to affected
individuals or the reactions that those people might have. While corporations have had
exposure to governmental regulation, individuals generally have not. This inexperience
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explains the failure of these property owners to educate themselves and give input in
regard to the applicable regulation until Hurricane Hugo made it more conspicuous.
Other scholars look for the roots or reasoning behind regulation. A common line
of reasoning contends that social regulation is required due to past actions or inaction.
Environmental historian Richard Andrews believes that U.S. environmental policy is a
“heterogeneous patchwork” that has been developed piecemeal through time, and that
most of the environmental crises that exist are due to a failure to regulate and, less
directly, to economic progress and the means by which it was effected. Policy, according
to Andrews, includes not only regulation as found in written form but also the obstacles
of lack of regulation, as during the colonial period, and deregulation, as in the Ronald
Reagan era. As this study will explore, the primary obstacle to the enforcement of
effective and progressive coastal zone management legislation in South Carolina was the
concern of affected citizens.
In his examination of modern environmental politics, Hays has suggested that
historical examination in this context is valuable because it can influence the usefulness
of modern discussion and that historians, as observers rather than participants, may offer
different and original observations.63 According to Hays, to properly analyze
environmental regulation, one must look at the circumstances surrounding it, the groups
influenced by it and the ends that will be served through it.64 This type of analysis is
useful in the subject study; in South Carolina, strong opposition existed to an effective,
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scientifically sound coastal zone management policy if property rights were thereby
affected. This opposition was so strong that it influenced changes made to the legislation.
The coastal zone is a battleground of interests, between public and private, citizen
and government, economic and environmental, state and federal. It encompasses
concerns that affect everyone who come into contact with this region where land and sea
meet and has even come to affect others who will never go there through its role in
defining the relationship between citizens and government. In this case, the voices of
citizens were louder than those of scientists. Despite the apparent need for tough
regulation, protest from society that related to the diminution of property rights won the
day in South Carolina. Representatives responded to the concerns of their constituents
and weakened the law, despite indications that stronger regulation was needed for the
protection of coastal resources.
Coastal zone regulation is a form of environmental regulation, statutes that are
difficult to write and harder to implement. Several factors make the composition and
implementation of environmental regulation tricky. First, environmental regulation is
frequently based upon science, and changes in scientific knowledge or theory are
frequent. In the case of coastal zone management, scientific understanding of erosion
and erosion-control devices evolved since the early 1970s and resulted in policy and
legislative changes. Second, environmental regulation can be costly. For coastal zone
management, sizeable expenses include renourishment of beaches and, potentially,
acquisition of expensive oceanfront property. In this case, legislators failed to take into
account the economic consequences to individuals that were affected by the regulation, as
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they looked only at the “big picture” of the state’s economy and its reliance on tourism.
Another problem frequently associated with environmental regulation that is illustrated
by coastal regulation is the reaction of groups within the subject society. In South
Carolina, there were citizens who supported strong coastal regulation and others who
blasted such regulation. Both used legal action to express their views. These groups put
more value on private property rights than on environmental protection. The subject
regulation was also made more difficult due to the fact that it applied to individuals who
were inexperienced with regulation rather than to businesses. Finally, nature can
influence the form of environmental regulation. Coastal zone management regulation in
South Carolina was impacted by Hurricane Hugo.
This study will look at the stages of South Carolina’s coastal zone management
policy and regulation and will attempt to determine why these changes were made,
considering especially the legal challenges made to the regulation in its strongest form
and from where these challenges arose. These changes, and the factors that led to them,
are helpful in identifying the difficulties faced by legislators who seek to devise
environmental regulation in all forms, and an evaluation of the legislation and policy is a
vehicle for determining if this regulatory scheme was successful.
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Chapter One
“Administration is the most obvious part of government…It is government in
action…”
--Woodrow Wilson
“The Study of Administration”
American concern for the environment, at least as a major societal and political
issue, can be traced to the 1960s and 1970s.65 Most of the modern environmental
legislation at both the federal and state levels has its roots in this time period. After
hundreds of years of development and industrialization which largely ignored
environmental consequences, a large segment of the American population began to see
the effects of their neglect in the 1960s and 1970s. High profile events, like the burning
of the Cuyahoga River in Cleveland, Ohio in 1969, and intriguing environmental
literature, including Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring in 1962 and the material of modern
muckraker Ralph Nader, caught the interest and attention of a generation of social
activists that had marched for civil rights and against Vietnam.66 Silent Spring alerted
Americans to the dangers of pesticides and documented how environment factors are
interconnected. The public became increasingly aware of pollution through the
development and advancement of ecology and through the goings-on of larger and more
vocal activist groups. Preservation of the environment and conservation became issues of
general concern among the American public, amidst the many social changes that had
occurred and were occurring in the United States since World War II.
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Additionally, the prosperous post-war economy allowed many families to
concentrate more on leisure than they had been able to before, consequently leading to a
concern for the environmental quality of personal activities.67 Though environmental
protection had been a public issue in the regulation-rich Progressive and New Deal eras,
the level of public consciousness of environmental hazards and awareness of other
environmental concerns in the 1960s and 1970s was greater than in any earlier period.68
The environmental movement of this period is distinguishable from previous
conservation movements, which sought to “conserve” nature through wise use for the
future use of the human race.
A turning point from the perspective of public involvement in environmental
concerns was Earth Day. On April 22, 1970, the first Earth Day was held. The
brainchild of Senator Gaylord Nelson, Democrat of Wisconsin, Earth Day was originally
planned as a one day teach-in on college campuses about “The Crisis of the
Environment.”69 A full-page advertisement for Earth Day ran in the Sunday New York
Times on January 18, 1970:
A disease has infected our country. It has brought smog to Yosemite, dumped
garbage in the Hudson, sprayed DDT in our food, and left our cities in decay. Its
carrier is man.
Earth Day is a commitment to make life better, not just bigger and faster; to
provide real rather than rhetorical solutions. It is a day to re-examine the ethic of
individual progress at mankind’s expense. It is a day to challenge the corporate
and governmental leaders who promise change, but who shortchange the
necessary programs. It is a day for looking beyond tomorrow. April 22 seeks a
future worth living. April 22 seeks a future.70
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The advertisement asked for responses and contributions, and both were received in great
numbers. Earth Day became a nationwide celebration. The ad and its response also
reflected how the environmental movement of this period differed from the conservation
movement, which worked more with corporations than against them. The day’s activities
were loosely organized and varied widely depending on location. Common events were
picking up trash and planting trees, but residents of some locales showed greater
creativity. In San Francisco, a group poured oil into the reflecting pool in front of the
office of Standard Oil of California in protest, and on Fifth Avenue in New York City
demonstrators held up dead fish to passersby and shouted, “You’re next, people!”71
Approximately 20 million Americans participated in the first Earth Day celebration.72 To
many, Earth Day represents the launch of a full-scale environmental movement in the
United States, a theory given credence both by the number of people who participated in
the event and by what followed it.
There was a major increase in both activist groups themselves and in
memberships in activist groups during this period, including an increase of about four
hundred thousand members in the five largest environmental organizations in 1970 and
1971.73 As a result of their size and visibility, these groups gained tremendous power.
This growth is one of the factors frequently cited by historians when considering why
environmentally protective regulations began to multiply in number and complexity in
the early 1970s. Regulation in general had expanded during the New Deal-era and had
71
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proved to be effective in many situations. This may be one reason the these groups,
which had more members, money and power in the 1960s and 1970s, chose to go about
environmental improvement through regulation as opposed to through direct action.
One of the key reactions to Earth Day and the feelings and ideas represented
therein came from the federal government. This response involved legislation that
included the National Environmental Policy Act and formation of the Environmental
Protection Agency, Clean Water Act, Ocean Dumping Act, Endangered Species Act,
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and Toxic Substances Control Act. In
fact, environmentally protective legislation was debated on and acted upon by every
session of Congress from the beginning of the 1960s to the end of the 1970s.74 These
lengthy statutes were vastly different from the environmental regulation that had
preceded them, offering detailed instructions, procedures and criteria for the agencies that
were produced. Environmental historian Samuel P. Hays has noted that the size and scale
of public institutions, including federal administrative bodies, grew at a pace similar to
the growth of environmental values themselves in the period after World War II.75 What
this means is that as people became more concerned about the environment, more
agencies were created to oversee the environment.
In 1972, the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) became law. The CZMA
states that “There is a national interest in the effective management, beneficial use,
protection, and development of the coastal zone.”76 This measure was, as a general
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matter, part of the expansion of national environmental consciousness that was occurring
in the United States. In earlier years there had been no environmental concern regarding
use of the coastal zone; coastal resources were viewed as unlimited in South Carolina and
in the other coastal states.77 In addition to the problems that this attitude created, the
coastal area was important and reflected a need for protection. The coastal zone was vital
to the nation and the individual states from economic and ecological standpoints, home to
rich natural resources, numerous wildlife habitats, scenic beauty and recreational areas.78
Specifically, the CZMA was a response to the recommendations of the Stratton
Commission of the Commission of Marine Science, Engineering and Resources as set
forth in a report, “Our Nation and the Sea,” issued in January 1969. The Commission
consisted of scientists, politicians and industry leaders and included representation from
the Ford Foundation, the Department of the Interior and Standard Oil.79 This document
made specific recommendations for coastal problems that were identified by the
Commission. The report recognized the unique nature of the area and the complexity of
the problems that existed there and wanted a federal agency to oversee the care of the
zone. The Commission determined that the most effective administration would be by
77
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the individual states but determined that the states currently lacked the machinery to
properly manage the zone. Because the coastal zone was unique to each state, and
because the states used the area in a variety of ways, they would be more competent at
managing their own coasts. As a result, the Commission recommended that the federal
government assist the states financially in establishing coastal zone authorities to plan,
regulate, acquire lands and develop public facilities.80 Other factors played into the push
for a federal program, including lobbying by environmental groups and requests by state
governments.81
Like any major federal legislation, consideration of what would become the
CZMA involved plenty of political disagreement from the start: President Richard Nixon
wanted a national land-use law; most of Congress wanted a separate coastal statute; the
oil industry was concerned about allowable ocean drilling; and many local governments
worried about their roles being diluted if federal legislation, and subsequently control,
was implemented.82 President Nixon, who apparently responded to the wishes of the oil
industry in this controversy, supported the Department of the Interior because it promoted
offshore drilling and development of deepwater ports to serve supertankers.83 A national
land-use law would have allowed Interior to follow through with these projects. Though
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the national land-use law failed, the separate coastal management statute succeeded. The
states were unwilling to accept the kind of control that the national land-use law implied.
Perhaps most importantly from the point of view of the Senate, the coastal management
statute sent money back to the states, whereas the national land-use law would not have.
Senator Ernest F. Hollings, Democrat of South Carolina, implied that this was one of the
reasons for the Senate support: “This law [the Coastal Zone Management Act] would
help hard-pressed coastal and Great Lakes states plan and manage development on lands
and waters in their coastal zones.”84 Hays reasons that environmentalists tolerated the
failure of the proposed national land-use law because they believed that large-scale
industry favored such legislation.85 As a result, the environmentalists sided with
Congress and supported the idea of a separate coastal management statute.
After a separate coastal statute was agreed upon, the next big question was who
would administer the program. President Nixon backed the Department of the Interior,
while congressional leaders favored the establishment of a new agency for the duties.86
Congress finally prevailed, in large part under the leadership of Senator Hollings, Chair
of the National Ocean Policy Study.87 As for a majority of the provisions of the CZMA,
Congress was relying upon the recommendations of the Stratton Commission that had
specifically recommended a new, consolidated agency for this role. The Commission
suggested combining the Environmental Science Services Administration, the U.S. Coast
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Guard and the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries to form “the base for a major, viable
Government agency…bringing to bear the scientific disciplines and other specialized
knowledge required to initiate a diverse, broad-gauged effort.”88 The Commission
thought that this joint organization might be called the National Ocean and Atmospheric
Administration or NOAA.89 It was stated in the CZMA’s legislative history that the
NOAA could offer “a broader and more balanced perspective.”90 Additionally, Senator
Hollings told the Senate that “after careful review the committee believes that NOAA is
the best qualified agency to undertake this complex task because of its capabilities for
dealing with the interaction of land and water problems.”91 The input of the South
Carolina senator provided an influential voice for his home state in the preparation of the
CZMA.
National policy as declared by Congress in the CZMA included the preservation,
protection and development of the resources of the national coastal zone. As to the
states, Congress declared that national policy was “to encourage and assist the states to
exercise effectively their responsibilities in the coastal zone through the development and
implementation of management programs to achieve wise use of the land and water
resources of the coastal zone, giving full consideration to ecological, cultural, historic and
esthetic values as well as the needs for compatible economic development.”92 This
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statement of policy indicated that economic considerations were not the only factors that
should be considered for the maintenance of the zone. It also demonstrated that it would
be the states, not the federal government, that would make the actual rules. The CZMA
authorized federal grants-in-aid (money given by a governmental agency to an institution
for a specific purpose), administered through the Secretary of Commerce. To qualify for
the federal money, a state needed to complete a specified planning process then submit its
plan to the federal Office of Coastal Zone Management for approval. To be considered
for approval, a plan had to show how the state’s coastal zone would be defined, how
permissible uses of land and water within the zone would be determined, a designation of
areas of particular concern and an explanation of the legal infrastructure (laws and
agencies) of the state’s program. Once approved, the state was eligible for funding to
implement and administer its coastal program. The amount available was up to fifty
percent of the total cost to the state for development of its program, with no set dollar
limit.93 This approval process was cursory and most programs were accepted with no
difficulty.
Each state’s agency was given general authority to administer land and water use
regulations. Each state was also granted the specific power to acquire land through
condemnation or other means when it was deemed necessary to achieve compliance with
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its management plan.94 As a whole, the CZMA gave the individual states great freedom
in designing and managing their distinct coastal zone management programs. It was
different from the majority of the federal administrative legislation enacted in the period
preceding it in that it offered “carrots” (financial assistance) as opposed to “sticks”
(threats to cut off federal funding). The only standard for approval was that the Secretary
of Commerce had to determine if the program met the basic requirements listed in the
statute. These requirements were: 1) that the state developed a program consistent with
federal goals as stated in the CZMA; 2) that the program included coastal zone
boundaries, permissible uses within the zone, designation of areas within the zone,
identification of means of control, priorities of use, organizational structure of the
program, definition of “beach,” planning process for energy facilities, process for the
assessment and evaluation of erosion; 3) evidence of coordination with local plans and
establishment of a mechanism for continuing consultation with local and state agencies;
4) evidence of public hearings; 5) review by the governor; 6) designation of an agency to
administer and implement the plan; 7) organization to implement the plan; 8)
consideration of the national interest; 9) procedures for conserving areas with
recreational, ecological, historical or aesthetic value; 10) designation of authority to
administer land and water use control and to acquire fee simple interests in land
necessary to achieve conformance with the program; 11) establishment of administrative
review procedure; 12) method of assuring that unreasonable restrictions on land or water
94
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use do not exist; 13) designation of areas of national significance; 14) public participation
in permitting; and 15) mechanism for adherence by other state agencies.95
The CZMA encouraged cooperation between the federal and state levels of
government, especially since the state agencies had to meet certain federal guidelines
(such as the consideration of the national interest when planning for energy facilities),
recognize other federal legislation that affected the coastal zone, and cooperate with
federal agencies that were already in place.96 For example, the Clean Air Act had
implications for wetlands permitting, was involved in coastal pollution control, and
established effluent standards for water pollutants. If a state’s agency wanted to impose
regulation that affected any of these variables, it needed to cooperate with the agency
responsible for the administration of the Clean Water Act, the Environmental Protection
Agency. The most important thing about the CZMA was that nothing was mandatory;
states were free to act or not. If they chose to act, the requirements to get federal funding,
as discussed above, were modest. As a result, South Carolina and the other coastal states
had the freedom to design almost any kind of coastal program that they wanted and were
able to take into consideration economic, geographic and political factors. Most Atlantic
coast states immediately responded to the offer of federal money and devised plans. The
only exception was Georgia; Georgia was willing to forego the free funds to maintain full
and complete control of their coast. Full autonomy was more important to Georgia than
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the cash offered by Congress. South Carolina, on the other hand, found the offer of
funding easier to accept.
South Carolina was hardly in the vanguard of environmental legislation and
regulation in the period that came to be known as the “Green Decade,” and many
southern states could be considered this way. (Samuel P. Hays has noted that most of the
interest in coastal environmental protection came from California and the northern
Atlantic states.)97 While most other Atlantic coast states had enacted legislation to help
protect at least their wetlands in the late 1960s and early 1970s, South Carolina
legislators had failed to do even that at the time the CZMA was enacted. Judging by the
timeframe of the adoption of the CZMA and the South Carolina statute, the CZMA was
the proximate cause of South Carolina’s General Assembly enactment of coastal
legislation. South Carolina legislators considered many variables when writing the first
coastal legislation.
First, the legislators considered the characteristics of the South Carolina coastal
zone and how it was affected by nature. The human desire for stable land-use patterns
are in conflict with the dynamic nature of the coastal system.98 Erosion is a distinctive
concern that both landowners and public users of the coastal zone must contend with and
attempt to manage. For this reason, people seek to control both their own behavior and as
well as the behavior of nature so that coastal resources can be managed as effectively as
possible, both from development and conservation standpoints. Laws are one means of
controlling and organizing the behaviors of human beings.
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Because of the complexity of the coastal zone, numerous values come into play
when considering how to regulate activities. Social ecologist Stephen Kellert has argued
that different segments of the population place different values on the coastal zone.
These include aesthetic values (the coast as a source of beauty and other physical
attributes), scientific values (the coast as a source of opportunities for scientific research
and understanding), humanistic values (the coast as a vehicle for bonds with nature),
naturalistic values (the coast as an area for exploration of and contact with nature) and
utilitarian values (the coast as a source of material and commodity benefits).99 As a
result, writing laws to govern the coastal area is a challenging process. Coastal zone
legislation is frequently contentious and, as was the case for South Carolina, may take
several years to formulate in its final composition.
Soon after the passage of the CZMA, South Carolina started toward coastal zone
legislation. In August 1973, Governor John West, through executive order, created the
South Carolina Coastal Zone Planning and Management Council. The body was made up
of eleven members, taken from the heads of state agencies and elected representatives,
and was charged with drafting and developing a management program for the coastal
zone in accordance with the provisions of the CZMA. Several attempts at legislation by
this group were unsuccessful because the General Assembly could not decide how
powerful the regulation should be, and the challenges came from every level of the
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process. Some bills were defeated in the House, some in the Senate and some were
vetoed by the Governor.
In 1977, the Senate Fish, Game and Forestry Committee sponsored a compromise
bill (S280) which passed the Senate and the House in May with only slight amendment.
Governor Edwards signed the bill into law on May 24, 1977. Act 123 of 1977, the South
Carolina Coastal Management Act, established the South Carolina Coastal Council,
which, on July 1, 1997, became an official agency. It also provided for the development
and administration of a coastal zone management program by the Council, including the
authority to issue and deny permits in critical areas as of September 28, 1977, as well as
authorizing legal proceedings to settle claims of private individuals to tidelands below the
mean high water mark.100
The Coastal Council, the new agency created to administer the act, was an 18member commission, with eight members to be chosen by the governing bodies of the
coastal counties, six to be chosen from the coastal Congressional districts by the Senators
and Representatives of those districts and four members taken directly from the state’s
Senate and House. All members were to serve four-year terms, except for the four
legislative members, who were to continue as long as they remained members of the
General Assembly.101 The legislative members were motivated to perform as their
constituents wished, or they could suffer the consequences of voter displeasure in the
next election. The other members did not share this motivation, as they were not elected
officials.
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The policies and directives of the Council were to be formulated under the
umbrella policy of the Act: “ ‘ to protect the quality of the coastal environment and to
promote the economic and social improvement of the coastal zone and all the people of
the State.’ ”102 The chief purpose of the Act was stated as “the proper management of the
natural, recreational, commercial and industrial resources of the State’s coastal zone—
resources of present and potential value to all citizens of the State.”103 Because of the
earlier failed attempts, this type of broad language was probably necessary for the
legislation to carry favor with both houses and the governor. There was little opposition
from coastal property owners and commercial developers to this original legislation,
which imposed few actual limits on construction, especially since the shoreline was
highly developed already. (There were no setback provisions that required a certain
distance be kept from the beach in the original legislation.) The permitting process did
not affect people who already had a house, and people who owned undeveloped property
could still seek a permit for construction, which they had no reason to believe would not
be approved given the advanced condition of development at that time.
William Eichbaum has noted that there is no single, unified public or uniform set
of values regarding the coastal zone. Groups tend to find management and policies
constructive when the use they make of the coastal zone is protected.104 Developers and
commercial property owners (those using the property for commercial purposes such as
hotels) are generally hostile to laws that limit where or how they can build on their
102
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property. This has been true for coastal property in South Carolina, but it was not
exhibited until after the original legislation was amended.
The state granted the Council two general types of management authority. As to
the critical areas, defined as coastal waters, tidelands, beaches and primary sand dunes,
the Council received direct control through the permitting program. The Council was
given the exclusive authority to issue or deny applications for alterations of any critical
areas. What this means is that a property owner who wanted to build a house, walkway
or other structure on a critical area (such as a dune) would have to apply to the Council
for permission. The Council was free to either approve or deny the permit after
considering certain factors required by the Act, including effects on the production of fish
and other natural resources, effects on endangered species and their habitats, effects on
public access to recreational areas and the impact on historical and archaeological
sites.105 A permit appeals process was provided for, with direct appeals to the Council
itself. If the property owner was denied a permit, he or she would have to ask the
Council to reconsider their decision before he or she could take any other action. An
aggrieved party could also appeal to the circuit court of the county where the project was
to be located, namely a “last resort.”
The second type of authority granted to the Council was “indirect.” In all the
counties that were included in the coastal zone by definition, the Council was granted
“indirect control.”106 This “indirect” authority was to be implemented through Council
certification of permits of other agencies and through memoranda of agreement between
105
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the Council and other agencies, including the Environmental Protection Agency and the
National Park Service, both of which had power to make certain determinations within
the coastal zone.107 More specifically, the Council was directed to manage certain areas
and activities, including pipeline corridors and estuarine and marine sanctuaries.108
Overall, power outside the limited areas defined as “critical” was modest. What this
means in terms of development is that a property owner did not have to ask the Council
for permission to build outside the critical areas. The Council was also designated to
develop and implement a beach erosion control program. The body was granted permit
jurisdiction over erosion control structures not otherwise covered by law, meaning that a
permit was required before a new erosion control device could be constructed, unless it
fell in an area that was covered by another agency (such as the National Park Service).
This first statute, while stronger than no regulation, was weak and allowed the
Council little control over construction or erosion-control devices, the two primary
human-made sources of erosion in South Carolina. Essentially, a permit was only denied
if “the project would permanently disrupt a priority use” of a Geographic Area of
Particular Concern (critical area).109 These uses varied by area but in general were
characterized by economic, environmental or recreational value. For example, a permit
that requested to build a structure that would block public access to a highly-used
recreational beach could and should be denied under the provisions of the original
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legislation. In reality, few permits were denied; this is likely because the regulations
were unspecific and vague and because of public pressure to continue development.
As a result, these types of structures, in the form of private houses and
commercial businesses, continued to proliferate along the coast. Development continued,
largely unhindered by the regulation, as did the erection of erosion-control devices like
seawalls by private property owners. As the prices for coastal real estate rose, so too did
the number of hard defenses and, subsequently, the severity of erosion. As a result of this
initial legislation, the condition of the coastal zone did not improve.

The CZMA was part of a larger movement toward environmental consciousness
that occurred in the 1960s and 1970s. It was a response to a perceived need for
regulation of this finite resource, based upon degradation and conflicts in use, as well as
to a general societal movement. In that it motivated most coastal states to initiate their
own coastal planning policies and processes, it was certainly a positive step. However,
its very flexibility, which allowed each state to customize its program to best fit its
unique coastal qualities, was also one of its weaknesses. In striving for elasticity, the
CZMA had so few requirements and obligations that states had too much freedom. In
short, some states enacted an ineffective program or made changes to existing programs
that rendered them ineffective. What each state chose to do with the resources offered by
the CZMA was their decision, and they were given little guidance under the CZMA.
South Carolina’s first attempt at coastal zone management legislation involved a
contentious process of give and take in the General Assembly. Because of the many
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conflicting users of the area and due to the competing values related to the zone, the
legislation that evolved was necessarily broad. Yet this statute was a good starting point
for the state, seeking as it did to properly manage and protect the coastal zone. The
General Assembly recognized the importance of the coastal zone, but it was also
motivated by the financial assistance offered by the CZMA.
This initial legislation established the South Carolina Coastal Council to oversee
the implementation of the new policies. The Council was given authority, via a
permitting process, over the area deemed “critical,” but this area was small. In short, the
Council had modest authority (it could deny permits in theory but rarely did) over a
limited amount of land (when compared to the state’s full coastal zone). The Council’s
authority to control development on primary sand dunes, while a great improvement from
the previous situation (i.e.—no regulation), was also modest. As a result, development
near the shoreline continued to accumulate at a rapid pace. South Carolina’s primary
concern was in limiting construction and development in certain areas, particularly those
in close proximity to the beach and its associated erosion zones, but because the
permitting process was so relaxed, not much got done. Natural processes remained, and
the anxiety associated with erosion still plagued “front-row” property owners (those who
owned lots directly adjacent to the beach and/or primary oceanfront dunes). Their
response, in many cases, was to erect a seawall that exacerbated erosion farther down the
beach. Within ten years, the situation deteriorated to a “state of crisis.”
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Chapter Two
“In Florida and Louisiana, and the Carolinas in 1989, people found out, yes, it can
be that bad…”
--Cathy Henry, North Carolina Division of Emergency Preparedness110

“…everyone who hears these words of mine and puts them into practice is like a
wise man who built his house on the rock. The rain came down…the winds blew
and beat against that house; yet it did not fall, because it had its foundation on the
rock. But everyone who…does not…is like a foolish man who built his house on
sand. The rain came down…and the winds blew and beat against that house, and
it fell with a great crash.”
--Matthew 7:24-27

The Coastal Council recognized that the protection of the coastal zone was not
progressing as well as had been hoped when South Carolina’s first coastal zone
management legislation was enacted. After the initial statute had been in place for almost
ten years, the condition of the beaches had not improved. In October 1986, the Council
appointed the Blue Ribbon Committee on Beachfront Management to investigate beach
and dune erosion in South Carolina and to make recommendations to improve the
situation. The Committee was made up of developers, environmentalists, and state and
local representatives.111 The following March, the Committee issued its report, finding
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that “the South Carolina beach/dune system is now in a state of crisis.”112 The
Committee’s report stated that over 57 miles of the state’s beaches were critically
eroding, which it attributed to three principal factors: rising sea levels, poorly planned
development that was infringing upon the beach/dune system and an overall lack of
comprehensive beach management planning.113 (The sea level rose over one foot in the
20th century, thereby consuming approximately 1,000 feet of beach. Though some
changes in sea level are normal, this dramatic rise is usually attributed to global
warming.)114
The Committee’s report noted that the “shoreline is a resource which is vitally
important to the citizens of this state and to the state’s economy as it annually attracts
millions of visitors and generates approximately two-thirds of the state’s annual $3.75
billion dollar tourist industry.”115 The Committee sought to protect the coast as a
resource for the state and its economy, but the economic situation of individual coastal
property owners was not considered in the committee’s findings nor was it considered in
the recommendations made to the General Assembly.
The Committee further concluded that the South Carolina Coastal Zone
Management Act had been ineffective in controlling development because “too little
authority over the beach/dune system was given to the Coastal Council which is
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responsible for administering the Act.”116 In turn, the Committee determined that the
Council was unable to prevent unwise placement of structures (both homes and
businesses) near the eroding areas. The Council did not have enough power to make and
enforce the kinds of decisions that needed to be made in terms of structural siting. There
were no defined rules about when a permit had to be denied. Additionally, the
Committee noted that many owners of oceanfront property sought and received permits
from the Council to erect erosion-control devices such as seawalls and bulkheads, most of
which actually resulted in increased erosion and other negative effects.117 The
Committee’s report seemed to suggest that the Coastal Council must be given hard,
definite rules under which permit requests would be denied. Otherwise, it seemed as
though the Council granted most applications for permits. The Commission proposed a
way to give the Council legislative power to deny permits for lots that had not been
developed or in case a structure was destroyed. The proposed rules would require a
denial in set, defined situations, decreasing discretionary decisions.
The Committee set forth recommendations for future coastal zone management,
featuring “The Thirty-Year Retreat Policy.” This policy included the determination of a
“Setback Line,” which the Committee defined as “the location of the Base Line [the
location of the crest of a typical primary ocean front dune] based on a 30-year landward
projection as determined by historical erosion rate and not influenced by erosion control
structures or nourishment.”118 The Setback Line was significant because the Committee
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recommended that, following the effective date of the legislation, no new structures could
be constructed seaward of the Setback Line unless the owner met certain stated
conditions (such as having the lot platted prior to the effective date of the legislation,
providing a plan for removal of the structure if that were to become necessary and
obvious conditions such as meeting local building and zoning codes) AND received a
permit for such construction from the Council.119 In practice, this meant that unless a
property owner’s construction planning had progressed significantly and was relatively
small (since it would have to be moveable), the party would not be able to build in this
zone. Also, it meant that if a house or other structure was destroyed, it could not be
rebuilt if the lot was located within the zone.
Setbacks are extremely useful in coastal zone management. The purpose of
designating setbacks or a setback line is to exclude certain uses, most often the
construction of structures, from the areas close to the shoreline. The Council could use a
setback for multiple purposes, including the avoidance of damage from flooding and
erosion to structures, protection of ecological functions or ecologically critical or
sensitive areas, and the protection of public access to the shoreline (i.e.—to keep property
owners from building in such a way that public visitors are discouraged from going to the
shoreline.) Shoreline setbacks differ from program to program; they can be designed as a
uniform distance (such as 100 feet) or may be dictated by a natural feature.120
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In 1988, the General Assembly, specifically citing the report of the Blue Ribbon
Committee on Beachfront Management that had been appointed by the Council,
determined that the legislation in place to protect the coastal zone was inadequate, finding
that it “did not provide adequate jurisdiction to the South Carolina Coastal Council to
enable it to effectively protect the integrity of the beach/dune system.”121 As a result, the
General Assembly found, development had proceeded in close proximity to the
beach/dune system, resulting in accelerated erosion and other problematic
consequences.122
To combat these issues, the General Assembly, in July 1988, adopted substantial
amendments to the South Carolina Coastal Zone Management Act, commonly referred to
as the Beachfront Management Act (BMA). The most vigorous provision in these
amendments was the retreat policy: the BMA established a forty-year retreat from the
shoreline policy that called for a gradual retreat from the beachfront over the prescribed
period.123 What this means is that they planned for future development to move away
from the beach until it reached a point that erosion would no longer affect it.
Additionally, this would make the structures less vulnerable to hurricanes. Houses that
are located farther from the beach are less vulnerable to storm surge. Using historical
data (including aerial photographs) on the location of shoreline, the Council drew the
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baseline at the innermost (i.e.--most landward) point at which the shoreline had been
located within the last forty years. Beyond that point, the BMA banned development.124
As previously discussed, these types of regulations are frequently referred to as
“setbacks” or “setback regulations.” Setbacks can be thought of as a type of zoning, in
that they allow only certain structures to be built in certain areas, while disallowing other
types of development or specific structures in various places. Setbacks are extremely
important in coastal communities because they force developers or landowners to build
far enough back from the shoreline so that structures will not be in an overly dangerous
position when exposed to coastal storms. Additionally, they allow dunes and shorelines
to be conserved. This was a crucial development in support of South Carolina’s overall
policy, which was to control where and how development occurred. This was
controversial because development was not allowed over an invisible line. Theoretically,
this could mean that entire lots could not be used from a development perspective. In
other words, a property owner could be faced with an expensive oceanfront lot that he or
she could not build a house on after the passage of the BMA. Even more likely was the
possibility that a property owner could only use part of a lot or lots. It was not highly
controversial when it was passed because most of the oceanfront lots in South Carolina
were already developed. It would become much more contentious when scores of homes
were destroyed or severely damaged by Hurricane Hugo, since these property owners
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then had to apply for permits for construction if their lot or a portion of it extended over
the line.
Almost immediately, the setback provision was questioned by property owners,
but it was not an issue for the majority of property owners (since most already had
houses, hotels or whatever they wanted to build). By July 20, days after the passage of
the BMA, the Council indicated to Isle of Palms property owner Robert Willms Jr. that
he would have either have to move his new oceanfront home, which was under
construction at the time, or tear it down, as it fell seaward of the baseline by about eighty
feet. Surprisingly, Willms was not upset that he had to move the construction; he was
only displeased because he wanted a clear and definitive answer from the Council about
where the house could be placed. “All I want is a decision. I’m upset because I can’t get
an answer from them. I’ve got a contract to build a house and they have not allowed
work to continue.” Willms added that he would comply with the decision of the Council
if it were to move the construction by ten feet but added that “I’m not moving back 80
feet without contesting.”125 This conflict was illustrative of several that occurred
between property owners and the Council in the early days of the BMA. Property owners
were generally unsure how the BMA affected them, and the Council was unable to give
to-the-point answers as they were still gathering data and had not yet made a final
decision on the setback line in some areas. Most of the property owners affected by the
law were individuals who had little or no experience with governmental regulation. They
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did not know what kinds of questions to ask, and few had participated in the formative
stages of the law.
“Critical area” was amended in the BMA to include the “beach/dune system
which is the area from the mean high-water mark to the setback line as determined in
Section 48-39-280,” as well as the previously included coastal waters, tidelands and
beaches.126 This was one of the most important sections of the amendments passed, as it
significantly increased the areas over which the Council had direct authority to control
future development. What these amendments meant to property owners was that the
Council could deny the request of a property owner to build on land that was not actually
part of the present day beach or dunes because it might be in the future. On February 11,
1991, the South Carolina Supreme Court held, in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, that the BMA was constitutional.127 (The Lucas case and its subsequent judicial
history will be discussed in depth in Chapter Five.)
In May 1991, the Council published its updated Regulations, including those
pertaining to permitting in critical areas of the coastal zone. Members noted therein, as
had the Blue Ribbon Committee and the General Assembly earlier, that their previous
authority had been inadequate, writing that the 1977 legislation “proved ineffective for
managing the beach/dune system because regulatory authority over these areas given to
the Coastal Council was not sufficient. From the State’s beaches, the Council could
previously regulate landward only to the primary oceanfront sand dune or to the highest
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uprush of waves where no such dune existed.” (emphasis added)128 As a result, many
landowners had continued to build as close to the water as possible and then sought
permits from the Council to build erosion control devices to protect their unwisely sited
and now erosion-endangered structures. With their new authority, the Council could
regulate all new oceanfront development.
The purpose of the new Regulations was to “aid developers and others in taking
advantage of the state-of-the-art techniques in developing projects compatible with the
natural environment; [to] insure consistent permit evaluation by Council and staff; and
[to] serve as a stimulus for implementation of better and more consistent management
efforts for the coastal zone.”129 The major changes from previous Council policies were
due to the body’s increased level of power via the 1988 Beachfront Management Act,
including the rejection of erosion control devices and the adoption of the policies of
renourishment and retreat.130 (Beach renourishment involves the excavation of sand from
one site and placement of this sand on an existing but retreating beach to slow the
landward retreat of the beach.)131 Through 1996, South Carolina spent over $50 million
on approximately twenty-eight distinct renourishment projects.132
The renourishment issue was significant because that is primary solution that was
advocated by some groups who opposed adoption of the BMA and the setback provision,
particularly developers and commercial property owners. South Carolina’s forty-nine
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savings and loan institutions became vocal opponents of the BMA. They argued that a
setback provision would devalue coastal property and that renourishment was the best
way to ensure a healthy beach.133
In addition to the problems they can cause, these types of structures do not
provide definite protection—nearly every seawall within the reach of Hurricane Hugo
was overtopped by waves and storm surge.134 Like South Carolina, North Carolina and
Maine have also banned the construction of permanent shore-hardening structures.135
Like the setback provision, the feature that denied property owners the ability to construct
erosion control devices was quickly protested. Days after the passage of the BMA, the
Council heard an appeal from Robert and Alice Beard. The Beards had been denied
permission to build a seawall (a popular type of erosion-control device) across a lot on
Cherry Grove (an area located just north of North Myrtle Beach) and to move three
existing seawalls on contiguous lots seaward. The request was denied by Council staff
and upheld by the full Council.136
Any regulation or other legislation that affects the ability of private property
owners to develop or modify their land will usually be subject to protest. As a result, it
was apparent that the BMA would meet with challenges. It was unexpected, however,
that the first and most significant challenge to the BMA would result from the activities
of nature itself, in the form of a massive hurricane and its effects on the South Carolina
coastal zone and the structures located there.
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While most relevant factors (see Table Three) affect the coastline subtly and over
time, the most dramatic instances of change and erosion are caused by coastal storms,
especially hurricanes. Hurricanes are responsible for the majority of the storm-related
damage to coastal property in the United States.137 These monster storms affect coastal
structures in several ways. First, hurricanes cause an abnormal rise in sea level known as
“storm surge.” Storm surge causes flooding and can be particularly harmful if the
hurricane makes landfall at high tide. Hurricane waves are also dangerous for coastal
structures, particularly those that are “oceanfront.” In addition to throwing water strongly
against the shore, waves can also move floating objects, like boats, piers, and dislodged
structures, against the shore and against structures located there. Higher than normal
waves can also move sand away from the beach, potentially causing collapse and erosion
of nearby land and, subsequently, structures.138
Hurricanes and other storms affect different parts of the coastal zone in various
manners. The most unstable areas of the United States coastline are the Atlantic barrier
islands. They are extremely vulnerable to storms, and debris taken from them by storms
can damage inland property. (Barrier islands, formed of loosely consolidated materials,
are extremely vulnerable to wind and waves, both of which are increased dramatically by
hurricanes. Consequently, the size, shape and location of barrier islands are always
changing.)139 South Carolina’s barrier islands include the Isle of Palms and Sullivan’s
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Island, both located near Charleston. These islands are fully developed, and property
there is especially costly.140
A coastal storm is classified by the maximum sustained winds that it contains. A
storm is referred to as a “tropical storm” when its maximum sustained winds reach thirtyeight miles per hour. Once the maximum sustained winds reach seventy-four miles per
hour, it is then classified as a hurricane and given a “human” name. Hurricanes are
evaluated via the Saffir-Simpson Scale, which uses a rating system that ranks hurricanes
in a category between 1 and 5.
Table Three141
Hurricane Ratings
Storm
General Level of
Surge
Damage
(in feet)

SaffirSimpson
Category

Maximum
sustained wind
speed (in miles
per hour)

1

74-96

3-5

2

97-111

6-8

3

112-131

9-12

Minimal: Most damage
is to plant life, with little
damage to structures.
Moderate: Major damage
to mobile homes and
some damage to roofing
materials of other
structures. Evacuation of
shoreline and low-lying
areas may be necessary.
Extensive: Large trees
may be blown down.
Mobile homes destroyed.
Serious flooding at the
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South
Carolina
Example (with
number dead
in South
Carolina)
Charley (1986)
(No known
deaths)
Storm of
August 27,
1911
(17 dead)

Hurricane
Hazel(1954)
(1 dead)

Property values for single family homes on the Isle of Palms range from $579,998 to $7,380,000.
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4

132-155

13-18

5

156+

19+

shoreline, and many
small structures near the
shoreline will be
destroyed. Evacuation
may be necessary for
several blocks within
several blocks of
shoreline.
Extreme: Extensive
Hurricane Hugo
damage to roofing,
(1989)
windows and doors, with
(29 dead)
many complete roof
failures. Flat terrain 10
feet or less above sea
level flooded inland as
far as 6 miles.
Evacuation of all
residences within 500
yards of shore or within
two miles if only one
story possibly needed.
Catastrophic: Severe
None known in
damage to roofing,
North or South
windows and doors, with
Carolina. An
many complete roof
example of a
failures. Many complete
Category 5 is
building failures. Major
Hurricane
damage to lower floors
Camille, which
of structures less than 15 was blamed for
feet above sea level
over 250 deaths
within 500 yards of
in the Gulf
shoreline. Evacuation of Coast Region in
residential areas within
1969.
10 miles of shore
possibly needed.

The problems of coastal construction led to a series of efforts by the federal
government to enact helpful regulations, the first being the creation of a federal flood
insurance program in 1968. It was launched primarily as an alternative to federal disaster
relief. As part of the program, communities were required to establish land-use controls

60

or other means of limiting the impact of potential floods. Though these responses were
beneficial, they were not as effective as had been hoped, and hurricane-related floods
continued to wreak havoc on the coastal zone of the United States.
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South Carolina’s hurricane history, while not as severe as that of North Carolina,
Florida or the Gulf Coast, does contain several storms of consequence that resulted in a
great deal of costly damage:

1810

Table Four143
Hurricanes Affecting South Carolina by Decade, 1800-2000
Decade
Number of Hurricanes
Category Three or Higher
Affecting South Carolina
1800
4
Yes
4
Yes
1820
3
Yes
1830
4
No
1840
1
No
1850
2
No
1860
1
No
1870
2
No
1880
4
Yes
1890
7
Yes
1900
3
No
1910
2
No
1920
1
No
1930
1
No
1940
2
No
1950
6
Yes
1960
1
No
1970
2
No
1980
3
Yes
1990
3
No
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As demonstrated by Table Four, South Carolina, between the 1960s and 1989,
experienced a lull in major hurricanes. As a result, many residents of the coastal zone
had not experienced a major hurricane when Hugo struck in 1989, either because they
were too young to remember the last major storm or because they moved to the coastal
zone from a non-coastal region during a less active period. This is likely a major factor
that led to increased development in the highly hazardous areas of the coastal zone.144
The low level of major hurricanes between 1966 and 1997, during which time only five
major hurricanes struck the East Coast, corresponded with enormous growth along the
entire eastern seaboard. Younger and newer residents were simply unaware of the
tremendous destruction that hurricanes, particularly major ones, can cause.145 Table Four
also reveals that the likelihood of a major hurricane in any ten or even twenty year period
is low. These odds may have given coastal landowners a false sense of security regarding
the level of danger to which their property is exposed. Storms do not occur in a regular
pattern or spacing; just because there was a forty-five year gap between Hurricanes Hazel
and Hugo does not mean that another major hurricane will not strike South Carolina until
2034. Hurricanes are unpredictable, except in how they affect coastal structures.
In 1954, Hurricane Hazel skirted the South Carolina coast after killing almost
1,000 people in Haiti. Hazel’s storm surge, at 14.5 feet, grinded and crushed the beaches
of the Grand Strand, from Pawleys Island to Little River. Windy Hill, today part of
North Myrtle Beach, was completely destroyed. Eighty percent of the oceanfront and
adjacent structures were destroyed in Myrtle Beach. Amazingly, Hazel had not directly
144
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hit to the South Carolina coast. This storm did not make landfall until reaching the of
North Carolina coast.146 Nevertheless, the effects wrought by the incredible storm surge
and high winds were devastating. Long-time South Carolina residents recall Hazel as the
only memorable storm to affect South Carolina before Hurricane Hugo. The next
significant hurricane to affect the South Carolina coast was Hurricane Gracie, which
made landfall in Beaufort County in October 1959. Gracie contained sustained winds of
120 miles per hour and gusts up to 138 miles per hour. Gracie was blamed for four
deaths and damage to 2,394 homes.147
In respect to hurricanes, the period between 1961 and 1980 became the most
lackluster in recorded history on the east coast and corresponds to the increase of coastal
development. Though these years neither slowed development nor increased the caution
of developers. This phenomenon has been referred to as “a lack of appreciation for
dynamic processes.”148 This period saw a surge in building in the coastal zone, both in
terms of housing and resort development, and there was little coastal storm activity to
deter or slow the rush.149 Other factors, including the growth in personal income and an
increased standard of living, improved accessibility via the private automobile and
interstate highway system and learned patterns of beach users, helped stimulate rapid
development of the coastal zone of the southeastern United States.150 However, the lack
of major hurricanes in this period is a frequently cited factor when considering the rapid
increase in development. In 1979, for example, Hurricane David hit the South Carolina
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coast and single-handedly cut away between ten and twenty feet of the foredunes in
Horry County. Yet it had little impact on the intense construction that was occurring in
the area.151 Between 1972 and 1978, the number of visitors to the Grand Strand alone
had gone from 2.9 million to 6.5 million, making it one of the most popular vacation
areas on the east coast. Accommodations increased as visitors multiplied, and
development in Horry County soared.152
South Carolina has been spared the hit of a Category Five hurricane, at least in
modern times. Hurricane Hugo, which dealt the state a direct strike in 1989, was a
Category Four storm. On September 5, Hugo was known only as Tropical Depression
11. On September 20, the storm, then named as Hugo, had resulted in the issuance of a
hurricane warning for the entire South Carolina coast, though it was still at sea, several
hundred miles southeast of Charleston. By 7 a.m. on September 21, the lower coastal
counties were already experiencing rain and 40 mile per hour winds as Hugo approached.
By sundown, Hugo was classified as Category Four hurricane, with gusts higher than 150
miles per hour. Around 11 p.m., Hugo made landfall near McClellanville, immediately
north of Mount Pleasant and Charleston. The eye of the storm passed over Charleston at
approximately 11:50 p.m. By 5 a.m., it was apparent to those who had ventured outside
that the damage to the coastal zone was calamitous. Twenty-six people died, and almost
65,000 had to find temporary shelter.153
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Soon after Hugo, President George H. Bush declared twenty-four counties in
South Carolina, including six counties in the coastal zone (Beaufort and Jasper being the
exceptions), to be “Disaster Counties.” The damage in these twenty-four counties was
estimated at $6.4 billion.154 Almost 80,000 single family homes were damaged, with
nearly 4,000 of those being completely destroyed. In Charleston and Berkeley Counties
alone, over 40,000 homes were damaged, with over 10,000 incurring major damage or
being completely destroyed.155 Disturbingly, the effects could have been worse: the true
erosional potential of this level of hurricane was not even realized because of the rapid
forward motion of the storm. Hugo moved at approximately twenty-four-miles-per-hour,
more than twice the normal rate of progression.156
Hugo destroyed almost every foredune north of Kiawah Island, though some of
the sand shifted only temporarily to protect the beach. Some beaches fared worse than
others, losing large amounts of sand that were washed inland. Emergency expenditures
for beach renourishment were close to $10 million, and projects planned for the 19901995 period carried a price tag of $62 million. Soon after Hugo, scraping of dunes from
available sand on the beach was required to preserve property endangered by the loss of
dunes and by the high tides that occurred after Hugo.157
The effects of Hugo varied by location and were based on a number of factors.
Areas with wide beaches and substantial dunes were more protected from the storm surge
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created by Hugo since the beaches acted as buffer zones. The more narrow beaches,
many with a history of erosion, were most heavily affected. Development near the shore
in locations with more narrow beaches suffered severe damage, despite efforts by some
residents to fortify the beach with large stones or concrete rubble.158 Dunes all along the
coast were severely damaged. On October 5, South Carolina began a project costing
approximately $100,000 per mile to rebuild dunes along about sixty-five miles of beach
where the dunes were most affected by Hugo.159 While this project was viewed with
criticism by scientists who favored allowing the sand to return to the dunes in its natural
cycle, other scientists approved the program since it would provide protection to
structures behind the dune system. This was deemed necessary because of excessively
high tides expected because of a close alignment of the moon to Earth.160
Hugo was the most damaging hurricane in United States history prior to
Hurricane Andrew. Hugo was not an overly large storm; as coastal researchers have
noted, it caused such a large amount of damage because of the level of development in
the low-lying coastal areas. Hugo’s storm surge in Charleston measured 12.9 feet. In
comparison, when Hurricane Camille made landfall in Mississippi in 1969, it included a
22.4 foot storm surge, yet the property damage it caused was drastically less than that
inflicted by Hugo, primarily because of development practices.161 Another important
consideration is that the damage would have been much worse had the storm struck south
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of Charleston instead of north.162 Fortunately, the highest storm surge was experienced
just north of the storm, near the mostly undeveloped area known as Bull’s Bay. South
Carolina was also fortunate that Hugo moved quickly, since the full erosion potential of
the storm was not realized.163
Folly Beach, despite being on the south side of the storm, experienced severe
damage, even when compared to other barrier island communities. The primary factor
involved in the damage to Folly Beach was its high rate of erosion. In the fifty years
preceding Hugo, an entire row of houses on Folly Beach had been lost to erosion.164 (To
put this figure into perspective, single family homes on Folly currently range from
$445,000 to $3,470,000.) A comparison to the damage suffered on the Isle of Palms,
which, like Folly Beach, endured a storm surge of twelve feet, is useful. Beachfront
houses on the Isle of Palms, though suffering water damage, generally survived because
of the wide beaches and substantial dunes that were present.165 Sullivan’s Island, which
required a local setback of one hundred yards for development, resulted in fairly good
conditions for structures during Hugo.166 This is not to de-emphasize the extent of
damage done to the Isle of Palms, Sullivan’s Island and the structures located on both, as
it was severe. In fact, it was several weeks before either the Isle of Palms or Sullivan’s
Island could be accessed by car since the only vehicular route to these barrier islands,
Ben Sawyer Bridge, had been blown off its pilings. (The bridge was not hoisted out of
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the waterway and back into place until October 5.)167 The comparison to Folly Beach is
only to show that areas with wider beaches and stronger setback requirements fared better
than those without them.
In addition to the wind and water, the Beachfront Management Act would have
something to say about how the oceanfront would look after the hurricane. When Hugo
made landfall in South Carolina, the BMA contained “some of the most stringent
reconstruction provisions in the country.”168 While it had been contested here and there
by a few property owners between its enactment and Hugo, it really had not affected that
many property owners because the coast was already so developed. It affected numerous
additional property owners after Hugo. Based on the policy of retreat contained in the
legislation, many homes destroyed or damaged by Hugo could not be rebuilt. The BMA
included restrictions both on new construction and on reconstruction in the event of a
hurricane. A structure deemed “damaged beyond repair” could be rebuilt in the setback
zone, but the reconstruction had to meet several requirements. The Council deemed
structures determined to be damaged 66 and two-thirds or more to be destroyed beyond
repair.169 First, the construction had to be located at least twenty feet landward of the
most landward point of the baseline. The new structure also could not exceed the original
square footage, and the owner of the structure was required to renourish the beach in
front of the structure on a yearly basis (unless it was already involved in a federal or state
renourishment program).170
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Essentially, Hurricane Hugo and the damage that it caused allowed the BMA to
work the way it was designed. In many places, it was a fresh start under the new law.
Since houses were now gone, destroyed by the waves and wind, the construction to
replace the destroyed houses had to comply with the BMA. This meant that all of a
sudden numerous property owners were affected by the provisions. People who
possessed fully constructed houses before Hugo had little reason to pay attention to the
setback provisions. After Hugo, they were directly affected.
The initial estimate by the Council was that 213 structures that would be affected
by the reconstruction provisions had been damaged beyond repair.171 Of this group,
approximately 159 were located in the BMA’s zone of retreat.172 The damaged buildings
included hotels, motels and single-family beach homes. Predictably, the response to
these restrictions by landowners was one of intense opposition.173 There were demands
to suspend or even repeal the BMA, including a request by Ken Corbett, a legislator from
the Grand Strand (Myrtle Beach area), for a special session of the General Assembly to
consider suspension or repeal of the BMA.174 Notably, Corbett won his seat from one of
sponsors of the BMA.175 The New York Times referred to the opposition to the BMA
after Hugo as “its most wrenching test of all.”176
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Though these provisions of the BMA were neither suspended nor repealed at this
particular time, they, however, were “loosened” by the Council. Several examples
illustrate this impression, including the adoption of a 1990 emergency order allowing
replacement of structures within the twenty-foot zone behind the baseline which were not
damaged beyond repair, if certain conditions were met. Essentially, this allowed property
owners to replace rather than repair buildings that were damaged below the Council’s
original standard. While this may have been more cost-effective for some of the property
owners, it was outside the standard set by the BMA.177 Another highly publicized
exception was the Council’s decision regarding the Kingfisher Pier seawall. The Council
voted to allow reconstruction of this seawall, even though it was damaged beyond fifty
percent and did not protect a structure. Critics argued that this decision went directly
against the intent of the BMA, which was strongly against hard defense of the
shoreline.178 Another example of the Council’s flexibility during this period was in
reference to assessments as to the level of damage suffered by a structure. The Council
allowed a second damage assessment when requested by the property owner, even though
a second assessment was not required under the provisions of the BMA. This had
dramatic results in some areas, often leading to a reversal of the original permitting
decision.179
Timothy Beatley, who has studied this period in coastal zone management
extensively, characterizes the actions of the Council during this time as a “tendency to be
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as lenient as possible.” Beatley attributes this tendency to several factors. First, this was
a high level of damage, compounded by the fact that the rules were new. The regulations
were not well-known, either to public officials or to coastal residents. Beatley notes that
there was “genuine surprise” from coastal residents in regard to the reconstruction
provisions of the BMA.180
Property owners, at least in some coastal counties, were further aggravated by
local zoning provisions. Counties had the ability to create zoning or other setback
restrictions as long as they did not conflict with state law. In Georgetown County, for
example, there was a twenty-five foot frontyard setback requirement, and few variances
were given. Horry County, on the other hand, gave a fifty-percent variance in terms of its
twenty-foot frontyard setback requirement to homeowners after Hugo to reduce the
potential burdens of reconstruction.181 As a result, a property owner could face two
drastically different situations as to reconstruction after Hugo depending on what county
their property was located.
The conclusion that there was a correlation between the extent of damage and the
amount of setback of the structure is an intuitive one: the farther away a structure is from
the water, the less damage it tends to have. Similarly, the idea that wider beaches and
substantial dunes offered more protection from wind and waves seems obvious.
Nevertheless, property owners seemed reluctant to make this correlation after Hurricane
Hugo. John Singleton, a partial owner of two motels in Myrtle Beach, told The New York
Times that Coastal Council regulations restricting rebuilding after Hurricane Hugo was
180
181

Beatley, “Hurricane Hugo and Shoreline Retreat,” 13.
Beatley, “Hurricane Hugo and Shoreline Retreat,” 19.

71

equivalent to “someone coming in here and slapping the heck out of your child.”182
James Kennedy, a property owner in Folly Beach who rebuilt his oceanfront home after
Hurricane Hugo, “readily acknowledges that Folly’s shifting sand may well be the kind
of place that should not have been built on.” However, he “add[s] that he never gave a
thought to not rebuilding, especially when insurance paid for everything but his $20,000
seawall.”183
The National Research Council, a private, non-profit institution that provides
scientific, technological and health policy advice under a Congressional charter,
recommended that no structures whatsoever should be permitted seaward of the ten-year
erosion line, with the exception of piers and docks. Additionally, they suggested that
only readily moveable structures should be permitted seaward of the sixty-year erosion
line.184 This proposed rule would allow natural processes to continue in the shorefront
area, maintain a permanent beach and conserve ecological processes and habitats. On the
other hand, it would impinge on private property rights and would face a tremendous
backlash from coastal property owners.

While South Carolina’s initial coastal zone management legislation was a step up
from nothing, it was insufficient to protect, preserve and restore the beach/dune system of
the South Carolina coast. As noted by The State, South Carolina’s daily newspaper based
in Columbia, “Before 1988, South Carolina had virtually no control over beachfront
182

Applebome, “After Hugo, a Storm Over Beach Development.”
Peter Applebome, “Hugo’s 3-Year Wake: Lessons of a Hurricane,” The New York Times, September 18,
1992.
184
National Research Council, Managing Coastal Erosion, 8.

183

72

construction.”185 Its problems, particularly the inadequate power granted to the Coastal
Council to administer coastal zone policy, were quickly recognized. The General
Assembly attempted to respond with changes to the legislation. They relied heavily on
the recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Beachfront Management. The
Committee’s suggestions were made with the goal of protecting the beaches of the state
for the good of the economy of the state. They did not consider the economics of
individual coastal property owners. When the General Assembly wrote the amendments,
they did not consider these individuals either. These amendments, passed in 1988, were
known as the Beachfront Management Act or BMA.
At first blush, the two most important provisions of the BMA were the rejection
of erosion control devices and the statement of the “retreat” policy. These two positions
were scientifically informed and forward thinking in terms of the preservation of the
beaches and dunes of the South Carolina coastal zone. In the long term, these measures
would improve the natural health of the coastal zone and promote natural processes.
Nevertheless, these provisions would not be without opponents and detractors. Two of
the key factors that would help determine the future of the BMA were the forces of
Mother Nature and the reactions of coastal property owners.
As indicated by Cotton Harness, the primary attorney for the Coastal Council
during this period, the conflict between private property rights and public interest is
significant on the oceanfront.186 In South Carolina the battle to protect beaches seems to
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be a catch-22. The state requires healthy and visually pleasing beaches to attract tourists.
Before Hurricane Hugo, the tourist industry in South Carolina was second only to
textiles. In 1988, tourists spent $4.6 billion in South Carolina, and forty percent of that
amount was on the Grand Strand alone.187 This need to protect beaches for economic
reasons is at odds with property rights and the desire of property owners for oceanfront
development. While the BMA initially sided with conservationists and those with
enough foresight to realize that the beaches must be preserved for the economic future of
South Carolina, it faltered in the face of post-Hugo challenges. It would be further
challenged by an individual property owner who, though not affected by the post-Hugo
provisions, considered the BMA too restrictive in its regulation.
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Chapter Three
“That the house of every one is to him as his Castle and Fortress…”
Sir Edward Coke
Semayne’s Case (1604)
“Today the Court launches a missile to kill a mouse.”
Justice Harry Blackmun
Dissenting Opinion, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council (1992)
While the demand for coastal property has intensified, especially since World
War II, obviously the supply has not increased. As a result, conflicts have arisen among
the many groups who wish to use the land. One of the most persistent and significant
conflicts has been how to determine the best balance among economic, environmental,
public use and aesthetic values to create the most suitable regulation of the coastal zone.
Dennis Ducsik of the Massachusetts Office of Coastal Zone Management has
characterized this conflict as “the struggle over sand,” where “the needs for expanded
recreational opportunities for the public” clash with “the desire for intensive private
development,” with both activities being “constrained by the existence of powerful
natural forces as well as fragile ecological systems.”188 As the demand for outdoor
recreation increased after World War II, so did mobility and extra income. Tourism,
particularly in coastal areas, grew rapidly.
Frank Goodnow, a turn-of-the-century expert on constitutional and administrative
law, argued that several of the social problems that were to be found in the United States
in the early twentieth century that still exist today were the result of the conceptions of
individual freedom and property rights found in the United States Constitution and these,
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Goodnow notes, were themselves derived from a consideration of eighteenth-century
economic conditions.189 Similarly, law professor James Huffman has contended that
private property have been looked upon as an impediment to environmental regulation for
two reasons: most environmental problems are not confined to legal boundaries and
parcels of land, and the Constitution put restraints on governmental actions that involve
private property.190 This is an apt observation when considering the management of the
coastal zone, which reaches across state, county and municipal boundaries on the east
coast.
The government sector is not the only active party offering input to coastal zone
management decisions. Among the active parties participating in development and land
use decisions that impact the coastal zone are property owners, developers and builders,
homeowner associations, neighbors or other residents affected by the use of a particular
site, lenders and realtors.191 All of these groups tend to look out for their best, and
usually economic interests. As a result, many of these groups hamper the passage of
regulation that would serve to restrict building and development for the purpose of
conserving the coastal zone.
An issue often confronted by regulators, particularly by those wishing to regulate
the coastal zone, is the question of takings. Takings are based on the Fifth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution, which states that private property may not be taken for public use
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without just compensation.192 “Just compensation” is defined as what a willing buyer
would pay a willing seller. There are two basic types of takings: physical occupations
(such as the use of property to widen a road) and regulatory takings. Physical takings are
accomplished through the concept of eminent domain, which is the power of the
government to seize private property without consent. Regulatory takings occur when a
governing body creates a regulation that affects land to a degree that it is as though it has
been physically taken. Though the landowner still physically owns the land, he can make
little or no use of the property under the terms of the regulation. The U.S. Supreme Court
has defined regulatory takings and crafted rules regarding regulatory takings via a series
of cases. Prior to the decision in Lucas, the rules were not particularly clear-cut, and the
key decisions were separated by several years.
In Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, decided in 1992, the U.S. Supreme Court found a
taking had occurred based upon a statute that denied the right to mine coal, even if the
mining operation might cause the land above the mining operation to collapse. The Court
settled on a broad rule regarding governmental regulation and takings. “The general rule
at least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too
far it will be recognized as a taking.”193 (emphasis added) The Court declined to state a
“bright line rule” in Pennsylvania Coal, maintaining only that takings questions were
questions of degree for which “cannot be disposed of by general propositions.”194
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In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, decided in 1987, the Court ruled that
the state of California must compensate landowners if it requires them to grant an
easement for public access to the beach, even if the state’s reasoning is that it is for the
public good. Specifically, the Nollans had requested a permit for oceanfront
construction. California’s Coastal Commission agreed to grant the permit on the
condition that the Nollans record an easement on behalf of the public to pass along the
beach. The Supreme Court ruled that this was a taking.195
According to Timothy Beatley, Professor of Sustainable Communities at the
University of Virginia, the failure of the legislature to address the takings issue in the
BMA was perhaps the most significant deficiency of the Act.196 This failure was brought
to light in 1989, when David Lucas, an aggrieved property owner, filed a lawsuit against
the Coastal Council, alleging that his inability to place structures on two oceanfront lots
based on the Beachfront Management Act had resulted in a regulatory taking for which
he had not received compensation. The Lucas case was significant for several reasons.
First, it could impact the constitutionality of the BMA. (Any of the courts that
considered the case could have declared the BMA unconstitutional because of potential
conflict with the U.S. Constitution, thus making the BMA void.) Even if the
constitutionality of the law was not affected, it could reflect South Carolina’s monetary
liability, or lack thereof, under the law. As noted by The Sun News, many real estate
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transactions and investments depended upon the outcome of the case.197 The case also
reflected the discontent of many property owners with the new law. Lucas was not the
only one filed in opposition to the BMA. In fact, when the first ruling was issued in the
case, several similar suits had been filed, including one by 43 property owners in Horry
County.198 Finally, it had far-reaching implications for land-use regulations nationally, in
terms of how it could affect takings law.
Wild Dunes is located on the Isle of Palms, one of several developed barrier
islands located near Charleston. Beginning in the 1970s, the Isle of Palms was subject to
extensive residential development. According to Lucas’s own account, he purchased
Lots 11 and 13 in the Dunesridge West subdivision in 1986 for $475,000 and $485,000
and planned to build a house for himself on Lot 11 and to build a “spec” house (a house
that he would then sell) on Lot 13. According to Lucas, there were only five or six
undeveloped beachfront lots in Wild Dunes when he purchased these two properties.199
South Carolina’s barrier islands were classified as “less developed,” in that fewer
than fifty percent of the state’s barrier islands have been converted to urban uses or other
built-up uses.200 From the standpoint of development, barrier islands are some of the
most vulnerable areas of the coastal zone to hurricanes, other storms and the natural
forces of erosion. By their nature, they are mobile, not fixed, geological features that
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grow and shrink in response to storms, changes in sea level and sediment supply. Barrier
islands can also be thought of as the first line of defense in terms of hurricanes and other
storms for the continental coastline.201 They are often the sources of great conflict, since
they are simultaneously in need of protection while often being dependent on tourism
economically.
In this case, the parcels of land immediately adjacent to those purchased by Lucas
in 1986 already held single-family homes. When Lucas acquired the lots, they were only
subject to the weak, original coastal zone management legislation; the more stringent
provisions did not appear until approximately two years after the purchase of the lots by
Lucas. Under the original legislation, Lucas could have built houses on the two lots. The
1988 amendments “barred Lucas from erecting any permanent habitable structures on his
parcels.”202 Lucas was one of a small group of property owners who possessed
undeveloped lots at the time the BMA was passed. He was not affected by Hugo; he had
simply chosen not to develop the lots up to that point.
Under the BMA, land that had been under water in the past forty years could not
be developed. As recently as 1963, Lucas’s lots had been entirely underwater, and the
parcels had been affected by high tides (i.e.-at least partially covered by water when the
tide was high) as late as 1973.203 As a result, the setback for this area under the
provisions of the BMA was well landward of the Lucas property. Structures on these lots
were likely, from a historical standpoint, to be affected by erosion in the near future.
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As Lucas recalled, he planned to begin construction in 1988 and wrote that he
heard about “pending beachfront legislation in Columbia” around this same time.204 He
revealed that he was “assured” that the pending legislation had a grandfather clause for
existing projects that would be applied to his project.205 In Lucas’s account, he wrote that
the Coastal Council “gutted” the grandfather language and called for a new setback line
to be drawn “using some pseudoscientific rationale.”206 Lucas acknowledged that the
Coastal Council line went all the way to behind his lots, taking away “any possible
economic use.”207 Though he referred to the science and techniques used to draw the
setback as “pseudoscientific,” photographic evidence showed that the lots had been
underwater within the twentieth-century.
Lucas felt that he was being treated unfairly compared to other coastal property
owners. He claimed that there only two lots (both his) out of the approximately two
hundred affected lots in South Carolina that were “entirely taken by this harsh new
law.”208 (He claimed that others may have been reduced in the amount of buildable area
but that they were still useable.) Lucas filed suit against the Coastal Council in the
Charleston County Court of Common Pleas, under the contention that his inability to
build on the lots “deprived him of all ‘economically viable use’ of his property and
therefore effected a ‘taking’ under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments that required
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the payment of just compensation.”209 His arguments were first heard by Judge Larry
Patterson of the Charleston County Court of Common Pleas.
The ruling by Judge Patterson came ten days after the case was argued, on August
10, 1989. The court found for the Plaintiff in as much as it found the Council’s action to
be a taking. The judge found the taking compensable under the U.S. and South Carolina
Constitutions in the amount of $1,232,387.50. Lucas would, under this ruling, have to
deed the lots to the state, and he would receive full compensation.210 While this decision
did not affect the constitutionality of the BMA, it was taken as an indication that South
Carolina might be subject to millions of dollars of liability. Some estimates put the
amount of potential liability as high as $40 million.211 The ruling pleased many property
owners, particularly developers and commercial owners. Joe Garrell, one of 43 Myrtle
Beach oceanfront homeowners who were part of a pending suit challenging the BMA,
called the decision “extremely significant.” Garrell, not coincidentally, owned the Litus
real estate firm in Myrtle Beach. He noted, “If the water comes in, we can live with that.
But for the state to place an arbitrary line out there,…we find that unacceptable.” But
environmentalists were not pleased. Michael Murdoch, president of the state Sierra Club,
stated, “I think this is a case where the public good has to be looked at…These kind of
laws are unfortunate, but it’s either that or not having any beach at all…It’s either move
back or have no beach.”212
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The Coastal Council appealed the decision to the South Carolina Supreme Court.
The Court reversed the decision of the trial court, determining “that the 1988 Act sought
to prevent serious public harm and thus was a permissible restriction on the use of
Lucas’s property.”213 Therefore, as determined by the South Carolina Supreme Court,
Lucas had not suffered a regulatory taking that entitled him to compensation. The South
Carolina Supreme Court decision came down on February 11, 1991, after almost a year
of deliberation. Chief Justice Jean Toal wrote the opinion for a 3-2 majority, reversing
the Charleston County Court of Common Pleas, stating, in sum, that the Council’s action
did not amount to a regulatory taking. The Court reasoned that no compensation was due
since the proposed use (construction on the lots too near the beach) threatened serious
public harm. Toal wrote, “Lucas does not challenge the fact that the legislation here is
necessary to prevent serious injury to the community, nor does he contend the setback
requirements affecting him are unreasonable or disproportionate to the goal of preventing
the specified harms. In fact, Lucas does not even seek an injunction to prevent
enforcement of the Act. Instead, Lucas merely prays for damages and asserts that he is
entitled to such, regardless of how the proposed use of his property harms the
public…”214 Chief Justice Toal reflected a clear understanding of the legislative purposes
behind the BMA with this opinion, which were essentially to protect the beach from
deterioration caused by unwise decisions by property owners.
Lucas did not surrender and appealed the decision of the South Carolina Supreme
Court to the U.S. Supreme Court. The high court does not have to hear every case for
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which review is sought. Of the numerous cases that seek to come before it, the Court
chooses only a few to consider, usually those that are believed to have widespread
application. In this matter, the Court granted the writ of certiorari, and the matter was
argued before the body on March 2, 1992.215 Over sixty parties filed briefs of amicus
curiae; approximately sixty percent of the briefs filed urged affirmance of the decision of
the South Carolina Supreme Court (i.e.-urged that the State be allowed to regulate the
property in the manner in question without compensation). The group that urged
affirmance included over twenty states, including coastal states like Florida and
California, landlocked states like Iowa and New Mexico (since this ruling could affect
other environmental regulations), and Great Lakes states (to which the CZMA also
applied) like Michigan and Wisconsin.216
The Court first addressed the effect of the 1990 amendments to the BMA on the
case, which had been passed after the hearing before the South Carolina Supreme Court.
(These amendments will be discussed in depth in the following chapter.) The Council
had suggested that the case was rendered unripe for review via the 1990 amendments.
The Court held on this matter that the case was not rendered unripe by these changes to
the law, which may have allowed Lucas to secure a special permit to build on his
property. The Court determined that it would be unfair to insist that Lucas pursue this
procedure as an precursor to considering the case ripe for review.217
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The Court noted that under the 1977 legislation, the two subject lots were not in a
“critical area.” As such, Lucas would not have been required to obtain a permit from the
Coastal Council under this legislation, which was the controlling legislation at the time he
purchased the lots.218 As further noted by the Court, this situation changed dramatically
after the application of the 1988 amendments, in that the two lots were seaward of the
baseline established by the Council. Therefore, no construction of habitable structures
was permitted.219 The Court then examined the primary issue of the case, the question of
whether or not a regulatory taking had been effected upon the two lots. They cited
Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon for the proposition that regulatory takings, as opposed to
direct appropriations of property, are compensable, further acknowledging the
Pennsylvania Coal provided little guidance on when a given regulation could be
considered a taking.220 The Court concluded that three basic principles would apply to
this case and would thereby become law.
First, the Court determined that a taking has occurred in a situation where “the
owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses
in the name of the common good.”221 The Court’s opinion in this regard, termed
“narrow” by some commentators, only applies when a property owner is deprived of all
economic value (as opposed to a reduction in value.)222 Therefore, this ruling would not
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apply to other landowners whose lots were effectively decreased in size under the BMA,
as long as they still had some economic use as to the property. Second, the Court held
that the determination of the South Carolina Supreme Court that this case should be
decided by whether or not the proposed action caused serious public harm was
inappropriate.223 As a result, the Court concluded, the only way that this matter would
not be a taking is if Lucas never had the rights in question under state common law. In
other words, if Lucas did not acquire the right to place structures on these two lots when
he obtained title to the property, then it was not a regulatory taking for the Council to
deny him this use.224
While the Court found it “unlikely that common-law principles would have
prevented the erection of any habitable or productive improvement” on the lots, it held
that the issue was one of state law.225 While reversing the ruling of the South Carolina
Supreme Court, the third and final holding of the high court was to remand the case to the
South Carolina Supreme Court for adjudication of the common law issue. The Court
emphasized, however, that to win the case the Council must “identify background
principles of nuisance and property law that prohibit the uses he [Lucas] now intends in
the circumstances in which the property is presently found.”226 The majority opinion,
written by Justice Antonin Scalia, was joined in by six of the Justices. (The decision was
a 6-3 split decision; Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justices Byron White, Sandra
Day O’Connor and Clarence Thomas joined in the majority opinion.) Justice Anthony
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Kennedy filed a concurring opinion, while Justices Harry Blackmun and John Paul
Stevens filed separate dissenting opinions. Justice David Souter filed a separate
statement.227 (Justice Souter’s statement was based on the opinion that the Court should
not have granted the writ of certiorari as an initial matter.)228
Justice Blackmun’s dissent was particularly forceful, and in it he questioned not
only the decision to review the case but also the principles upon which the decision was
made. He noted that the lots in question, and in fact the entire area around them, was
“notoriously unstable,” and, further, that “in roughly half of the last forty years, all or part
of petitioner’s property was part of the beach or flooded twice daily by the ebb and flow
of the tide.”229 Justice Blackmun was particularly disturbed that the Court overturned
years of precedent that assumed that “the State has full power to prohibit an owner’s use
of property if it is harmful to the public.”230 Blackmun concluded that the Court’s ruling
makes “sweeping,” “misguided,” and “unsupported changes in our takings doctrine.”
Justice Stevens disagreed both with the hearing of the case and with its reasoning. He
argued that the case should not have been heard until Lucas had exhausted his
administrative remedies (by applying for a permit under the newer BMA provisions).
Additionally, he disagreed with the Court’s expansion of the takings principle, which he
termed “illogical.”231
On remand from the U.S. Supreme Court, the South Carolina Supreme Court
remanded the case to the trial court for a determination of damages based on a temporary
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taking. The state court was not persuaded by the arguments of the Coastal Council “that
any common law basis exists by which it could restrain Lucas’s desired use of his
land.”232 Nor, the Court noted further, had their own research indicated any such
common law principle. As a result, the Court directed the trial judge to make specific
findings of damages to compensate Lucas for his temporary taking. (The taking was only
deemed “temporary” as Lucas was now able to file for a special permit under the new
BMA amendments.)233
Finally, in July 1993, the struggle ended. Lucas received $1,575,000, to be paid
to him by the State of South Carolina. He received less than $10,000 after paying off the
mortgages on the lots and his attorneys’ fees.234 The famous case was resolved in whole
in November 1993 when, according to Lucas’s account, the lots were sold via auction by
the state to a developer for $730,000.235 (The lots were now potentially developable by
consent of special permit as per the amendments passed after Hugo and the first Lucas
decision.) The state was criticized for the decision, even by legislators. Senator Larry
Richter, a Republican from Charleston, stated, “The state certainly looks pretty silly. It’s
the sort of stuff the public is ticked off about.”236

The decisions in Lucas have had two primary impacts upon coastal zone
management policy and legislation in South Carolina. First, the Lucas decision was
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significant because it brought to light the potential financial liability of the state as to
prohibitions on building in the coastal zone. Second, the decision of the Charleston
County Court of Common Pleas (the initial victory for Lucas as plaintiff), issued in
August 1989, served as a buttress for property owners who were dissatisfied with the
provisions of the BMA following Hurricane Hugo. As a result, this decision was one of
the key factors in the writing and passage of the 1990 amendments to the BMA.237 These
amendments would move South Carolina into an era of weaker coastal zone management
policy and regulation. The Lucas case was an example of the type of property owner
protest that occurred in response to BMA. Citizens viewed the BMA as a restraint on
their private property rights, which they viewed as guaranteed by the Constitution.
Property owners valued the environmental protection of the BMA less than they valued
their property rights.
In a larger sense, Lucas’s plight had an impact outside of South Carolina.
According to Susan Murray, a policy analyst for the National Audubon Society, “David
Lucas has had an impact on the entire country.” Murray remarked that Lucas, who she
called a “sympathetic person,” had more appeal to the general public than run-of-the-mill
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lobbyists. After the resolution of the case, Lucas formed the Council on Private Property,
a national legal action and lobbying group.238
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Chapter Four
“The countryside is the most intense battleground of all in the environmentaldevelopmental contest, and it is at the state level – in the General Assemblies, the
administrative agencies, and the hearing boards and courts that these
controversies can be best identified.”
--Samuel P. Hays
A History of Environmental Politics Since 1945

As public policy professor Cary Coglianese has noted, “Just as environmental law
came into existence due to politics, so too can it be changed due to politics.”239 This idea
is certainly applicable to coastal zone management legislation in South Carolina. In
summer 1990, following Hurricane Hugo and the backlash to the 1988 amendments, as
well as in the wake of the trial court’s decision in Lucas (issued in August 1989), the
General Assembly wrote revisions to South Carolina’s coastal zone management law.
These alterations have been referred to as “a political retreat from retreat.”240 Like all
elected bodies, members of the South Carolina General Assembly are subject to pressures
from their constituents. In this case, many coastal citizens were angered by the
provisions of the BMA, which fully came to light after the damage wrought by Hurricane
Hugo. As a result, a number of legislators from coastal counties sought to weaken the
BMA through amendment.
The amendments were introduced by Jim Waddell, a Democratic Senator from
Beaufort (a coastal county located between Charleston and the Georgia border). In
formulating the 1989 amendments, Waddell worked with the South Carolina Tourism
Council, a group comprised largely of bankers and developers. Ironically, Waddell was a
239
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former member of the Coastal Council who supported the BMA when it was passed. He
acknowledged that he lost votes in the November 1988 election due to his support of the
BMA; this is likely the reason that he changed his position on the strength of the law.241
Like Waddell, Senator Bud Long of Horry County (a coastal county that includes Myrtle
Beach) pushed for changes that weakened the law. Long fought for more permissive
seawall standards and fewer restrictions on coastal construction.242
Many developers and property owners protested the BMA “from the day it
became law” as being too restrictive toward construction.243 Austin Beveridge of Fripp
Island decried the passage of the BMA in a letter to the editor of The State. He wrote,
“Nobody is going to invest along the beachfront in South Carolina. Everybody in South
Carolina stands to lose from this misguided Beachfront Management Act.”244 Developers
and commercial landowners were pleased with the changes to the law. Doug Martin,
president of the Myrtle Beach Area Hotel and Motel Association, was encouraged by the
changes. “For developed areas of the beach,” he said, “there’s no question the [original
BMA] lessened the value of property. If you can’t put a building on a piece of property
and protect it with a seawall, that obviously lessens the value.”245 The Sun News, the
daily paper for the greater Myrtle Beach area, supported the revisions. An editorial
printed therein supported the amendments because of their treatment of seawalls, though
it warned citizens that developers “have often found ways to challenge such laws.” The
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newspaper was critical of the elimination of the dead zone but supported provisions that
continued renourishment.246
Despite these criticisms, some positive aspects of the original version of the BMA
remained in force. The revised BMA did maintain the forty-year erosion line and the size
restrictions (5000 square feet) on structures that were added to the law in 1988.247
Constraints on hard erosion control devices were actually increased; once seawalls are
damaged beyond a certain extent (which changes via a stated timeline), they could not be
rebuilt.248 As previously discussed, this move away from hard erosion-control devices
was crucial, both in terms of maintaining natural processes and conserving “downstream”
beaches that often erode more severely due to the effects of seawalls placed to protect
structures behind neighboring beaches. With the vocal exception of developers and
commercial property owners, most citizens seemed to support the move away from
erosion-control devices. An editorial in The Sun News stated, “Seawalls exacerbate
scouring by the ocean, reducing the sand available on the recreational beach.” The
editorial also stated that eliminating the anti-seawall provision would be “kowtowing to
the developers.”249
There were, however, other major changes, as the “retreat from retreat” comment
implies. The new BMA considerably weakened the setback provisions that had
responded to the concerns of the Blue Ribbon Committee. The twenty-foot no
construction zone was eliminated entirely. Construction seaward of the baseline,
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although technically not allowed, was designated as tolerable, via eight listed, allowable
exceptions.250 Additionally, the new BMA created a procedure that allowed the Council
to issue permits for construction seaward of the baseline if certain conditions were met,
including that the owner must be willing to remove the structure if ordered to do so by
the Council.251 (This was the special permitting procedure considered by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Lucas.) Overall, it is impossible to view these amendments in any way
except as a deterioration of the 1988 version of the BMA.
Despite the indication that coastal voters were not behind the BMA, there were
some outspoken coastal citizens who supported the stronger provisions. Constance
Angeletti, a Hilton Head resident, applauded the BMA. She wrote, “Without a setback
line, developers will continue to build close to the beach.”252 She later complained to The
State that “the ‘greedy profiteers’ will continue to rape our beaches and pollute the
estuaries, marshes and the environment in general to the detriment of all South
Carolinians.” The amendments to the BMA, she wrote, “will make the aftermath of the
Civil War pale into insignificance by comparison.”253
Furthermore, a 1989 South Carolina poll conducted by Metromark Market
Research for The State indicated that voters were concerned about beachfront
development. A third of those polled were in favor of leaving the BMA intact, and an
additional third were in favoring of strengthened to set even greater limits on beachfront
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construction. According to the poll, which consisted of 508 registered voters, only about
eighteen percent favored weakening the BMA.254
The work of Coastal Council has been judged in a positive light. Environmental
groups have praised the agency, and it has been viewed by many as the driving force
behind the 1988 amendments.255 In 1992, the South Carolina Coastal Council won the
Excellence in Coastal Zone Management award given by the NOAA.256 A year later,
South Carolina had received $21,704,612 in matching grants from the Office of Oceans
and Coastal Resources Management for the administration of its coastal program.257
Large portions of this money were used for general administration of the state’s program,
but a great deal of it was used for renourishment projects. Despite these positive
indications, the Coastal Council did not continue as the administrative agency responsible
for the legislation. South Carolina’s coastal zone management legislation was amended
again in 1993. As part of these amendments, the Coastal Council ceased to be an
independent agency and was absorbed as a division of the South Carolina Department of
Health and Environmental Control. It was renamed the Office of Ocean and Coastal
Resource Management (OCRM).258 The next year, former members of the South
Carolina Coastal Council became members of the South Carolina Coastal Zone Appellate
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Panel, which was designated to “act as an advisory council” to DHEC. DHEC was given
the Council’s original mandate to administer the state’s coastal zone management
program, including the power to approve or deny permits for construction and
development.259 Essentially, this meant that DHEC would have the final decision as the
permitting and other regulatory decisions. The DHEC Commissioner was now the final
decision-maker as opposed to the chair of the Coastal Council. Wayne Beam, a Chester,
South Carolina, native with a doctorate in environmental sciences and part of the Coastal
Council since its inception, was critical of the decision and observed, “We have gone out
and written legislation. When we talk about being independent, I’m talking about going
up against the Highway Department and the Department of Commerce. The forces that
control DHEC won’t do that.”260
During its tenure as the administrative body of South Carolina’s coastal zone
management program, OCRM seems to have erred on the side of private landowners. In
2001, the South Carolina Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the South Carolina Coastal
Conservation League and the Sierra Club, organizations that protested DHEC’s decision
to issue a permit for the refurbishment of a groin field and the construction of new groins
along the beach on Hilton Head Island. Such an act had been prohibited by the BMA.261
(Groins are a type of hard shoreline defense.) The Court noted that BMA showed a clear
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legislative choice against armoring of the shoreline. Additionally, the Court cited that
portion of the BMA which denies construction seaward of the baseline.262
DHEC’s argument was that the BMA did not specifically include groins in its list
of erosion control devices. (While this is technically the case, the statute does not
attempt to give an exhaustive list of all erosion control devices. It only states that erosion
control devices “include” seawalls, bulkheads and revetments.)263 The Court held as a
matter of law that the BMA prohibited the issuance of permits for the construction or
reconstruction of new or existing groins.264 This case is significant for several reasons.
DHEC was clearly erring on the side of the private property owners in making this
decision. Hilton Head Island is an exclusive area with extremely high property values.
As such, it is clear why property owners there wanted to construct shore armoring
devices. However, the BMA is clear in its intent to end construction of erosion-control
devices. By issuing this decision, DHEC seems to be indicating a preference contrary to
the goal of the legislature.
Despite the state’s movement away from strong regulation, some South Carolina
communities have instituted stronger control of development. Spring Island, South
Carolina, located south of Charleston near Beaufort, is an example of development based
on strict environmental standards. Changes to the BMA altered nothing about Spring
Island, which has self-imposed setback restrictions more stringent than those included in
the 1988 form of the BMA. The owners and developers of Spring Island, James Chaffin
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and James Light, purchased the island in 1989 for $17 million. The Spring Island
developers transplant trees rather than cutting them down and offer no paved roads. A
third of the 3,500 acre island has been set aside as a nature preserve. Chaffin and Light
were approved for 5,500 units of development but chose to only have 500 units. Instead
of the three possible golf courses for which they were approved, they chose to build only
one, which would follow the contours of existing corn fields.265
Another example of a community committed to “protecting and nurturing the
ecosystem” is Dewees Island, located eleven miles north of Charleston.266 Like Spring
Island, Dewees Island has many restrictions designed to respect the land, water and
wildlife. The only vehicles allowed on the island are golf carts, yet even they are not
allowed on the beach. Recycling is mandatory, as is community service with the
environmental staff of the island. Construction on the island is limited to 150 units, by
agreement between the owners of the island and South Carolina. Activities that may
harm “drainage, flood control, water conservation, erosion control or soil conservation, or
fish and wildlife habitat preservation” are strictly prohibited.267
While developments and communities like Spring Island and Dewees Island
should succeed from the standpoint of conservation, they are unavailable to the majority
of South Carolina residents because of their cost. Lots and homes on the islands are
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expensive, putting them out of the price range of the majority.268 Nevertheless, these
progressive regulations are available to other communities, should they choose to
implement and enforce them. The National Research Council has argued that “a single
uniform national ‘answer’ to erosion problems is neither practical nor desirable.”
Further, the National Research Council has asserted that specific, localized conditions
should determine rules for setbacks, relocation of endangered structures, beach
nourishment and shoreline armoring.269 Locally enacted regulations may be the best
system for protecting coastal resources, but up to this point, they have only been used by
upscale communities.
Another possibility for conservation in the coastal zone is through the concept of
sustainability. Sustainable use, or sustainability, of the coastal zone is defined as the
planning and management of economic development of the coastal zone so as to achieve
a balanced, maximum, and resource-constrained flow of benefits which is economically
and environmentally sustainable. This movement has also been known as wise use or
conservation.270 This idea is already being explored through the Center for Sustainable
Living, a public-private-academic partnership located in Charleston. (The Center has
several public “partners,” including the South Carolina Sea Grant Consortium, Clemson
University Extension Service, City of Charleston, Charleston County and Federal
Management Agency. It is also supported by about fifty private donors, which include
individuals and businesses. A full list of partners and donors can be found on the
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Center’s website.) It was designed “to conduct education programs to help minimize
threats from natural disasters and to enhance resource conservation.” The Center
develops techniques and offers assistance programs in the areas of natural hazards
mitigation, sustainable building practices and sustainable living.271 Policies like those
explored at the Center for Sustainable Living and regulations like those in place on
Spring Island and Dewees Island are necessary for consideration since current policies
and regulations are falling short in terms of protecting the coastal zone.
On the whole, it seems that South Carolina’s journey into coastal regulation began
positively (when it created regulation where none existed). It continued to improve with
the passage of the BMA. Hugo and Lucas, however, revealed opposition to the BMA
that resulted in amendments. This was backtracking from the point-of-view of coastal
protection. These changes were possible due to the nature of the CZMA. Because of the
flexibility of the CZMA, there was no “natural” way for coastal statutes to evolve. The
CZMA was designed to be discretionary so that individual states were able to decide on
the best policy for their geography, economy and political situation.
A comparison between the North Carolina and South Carolina programs is useful
to demonstrate the unrestricted and flexible nature of the CZMA as well as to reveal the
distinctive qualities of South Carolina’s program and how the South Carolina program
evolved. The character and structure of coastal zone management programs under the
CZMA varied widely from state to state. Some states, including the Carolinas, passed
comprehensive legislation as a framework for their programs. Others opted to use
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existing land-use regulations as the foundation for their program or to link existing
single-purpose laws into a comprehensive umbrella for coastal zone management. In the
1970s, South Carolina’s geographical neighbor, North Carolina, also implemented a
coastal management program under the CZMA.272 Although politically and
economically relatively similar to South Carolina, North Carolina’s coastal zone is
different. It is much more dominated by highly dynamic barrier islands. Additionally,
North Carolina beaches are more prone to erosion. As a result, the coastal management
plan is also different in several respects.
North Carolina’s coastline is almost 320 miles in length and includes 23 separate
islands, including the Outer Banks area, that are extremely dynamic. The state has been
hit by more storms that either South Carolina or Georgia, including more major
hurricanes. North Carolina is also more prone to winter storms, which may also cause
severe damage and increase shoreline erosion. Fortunately, almost half of North
Carolina’s ocean coasts are publicly owned, with the two most significant holdings being
the Cape Hatteras and Cape Lookout National Seashores. Together these two federal
holdings constitute 127 miles of ocean frontage.273 Another feature that makes North
Carolina different involves waves. Experts classify those striking the North Carolina
shoreline as “energetic,” meaning that they move a great deal of sand. On the Outer
Banks of North Carolina, it has been estimated that as much as seven hundred thousand
272
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cubic yards of sand annually may move from north to south along a stretch of beach.
This is as much as seventy thousand medium-sized dump trucks.274 (South Carolina’s
coastline is transitional between the wave-dominated coast of North Carolina and the
tide-dominated coast of Georgia. South Carolina is generally less susceptible to dramatic
erosion trends than North Carolina.)275
North Carolina submitted its coastal zone management proposal for approval
fairly quickly. Its Coastal Area Management Act (CAMA) was passed by the North
Carolina legislature in 1974. CAMA involved “the most intense debate of any
environmental bill in the state’s history.”276 In September 1978 CAMA received federal
approval.277 It defines its coastal zone to include any county that either borders on the
Atlantic Ocean or any body of water containing salt water. (As aforementioned, each
state can designate its coastal zone, and thus the area subject to regulation under its
program, as it sees fit. Some states, Florida and Delaware for example, have designated
their entire state as a coastal zone.) CAMA has both a regulatory prong and a planning
prong. Both parts receive policy direction through the Coastal Resources Commission
(CRC), a group of fifteen citizens appointed by the governor. The CRC is advised by the
Coastal Resources Advisory Council (CRAC), a group of forty-seven local government
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representatives. Under the planning unit, local land use plans must be adopted. If a
locality fails to adopt a plan, the CRC will write one for that locality.278
Similarly, South Carolina adopted local beach management plans as part of its
post-Hugo amendments. The South Carolina provisions required that local governments
must prepare, by July 1, 1991, a “local comprehensive beach management plan.” These
documents were required to incorporate, at a minimum, ten stated elements, including
analysis of erosion control devices, an inventory of structures located seaward of the
setback line and “a detailed strategy for achieving the goals of preservation of existing
public access and the enhancement of public access to assure full enjoyment of the beach
by all residents of this State.”279 The regulatory program only comes into play for what
South Carolina early on termed critical areas—those designated by the CRC as areas of
environmental concern. All development in these areas is subject to the CRC’s permit
standards, which are administered at the state level if deemed “major” or at the local level
if deemed “minor.” Development is considered “major” if it would require another state
or federal permit, if it involves more than twenty acres of land disturbance or if it will be
larger than 60,000 square feet.280 The CRC hears appeals from both types of permitting
decisions.281

Like South Carolina, the CRC also banned shore-hardening devices.282

In June 1979, North Carolina adopted its setback provisions. Under these
regulations, development in areas of environmental concern must be located at a
minimum, the furthest landward of four designated points: “1) a distance 30 times the
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long-term annual erosion rate, measured from the vegetation line; 2) behind the crest of
the ‘primary’ dune (defined as the first dune with an elevation equal to the 100 year storm
level plus six feet); 3) behind the landward toe of the ‘frontal’ dune (defined as the first
dune with sufficient height, vegetation, continuity and configuration to offer protective
value; or 4) 60 feet landward of the vegetation line.”283
After the adoption of these setback provisions, it was estimated by the CRC that
approximately 800 oceanfront lots would be undevelopable. Two exceptions were
adopted soon thereafter. These measures allowed insubstantial structures (such as
parking areas, campgrounds and small gazebos) between the vegetation and setback lines,
provided there is no dune alteration, and permitted an exemption to the erosion rate
setback for lots that existed prior to June 1, 1979, if several extensive requirements were
met.284 This is an important distinction when compared to South Carolina’s 1988 version
of the BMA. The BMA appeared to be harsher, in that it allowed no structures.
Nevertheless, an estimated 500 lots were still left undevelopable under the North
Carolina regulations.285
As part of its coastal zone management program, North Carolina stressed
education and policy development. Some coastal zone management scholars have argued
the successful coastal management programs require public education to gain broad
support for and participation in the program.286 North Carolina’s educational program
has focused on coastal hazards and sound development practices and was directed toward
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realtors, developers, bankers, planners and elected officials.287 These initiatives were in
line with 1990 recommendations of the National Research Council, which argued that “a
more informed or educated public (including buyers, sellers, developers, planners,
engineers, and public officials) would be able to make better long-term coastal
development decisions.”288

In 1990, South Carolina amended its coastal zone management legislation in the
wake of two events: Hurricane Hugo and the trial court decision in Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council. The events following Hugo were significant because they
indicated an extreme level of dissatisfaction with the 1988 version of the BMA, at least in
terms of vocal coastal property owners. The decision of the trial court in Lucas, which
had awarded significant monetary damages to the property owner, seemed to indicate that
South Carolina would be in several expensive lawsuits if the BMA were not modified.
The 1990 amendments, while maintaining the general policy of retreat and
reinforcing the commitment to move away from hard erosion control, weakened the
state’s regulatory power and its coastal zone management policy. In the face of the 1989
opposition, the General Assembly chose to ignore, at least in part, recommendations
given to it only a few years earlier by the Blue Ribbon Committee on Beachfront
Management. Now, property owners would be able to build in areas that had only
recently been covered by water and that could be again, by meeting only a few
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requirements. In its third attempt to sort out its policy, the General Assembly had
backtracked.
In 1993, the General Assembly continued to tinker with coastal zone management
legislation, this time changing the administration of the policy. The Coastal Council,
which had been the agency responsible for the state’s coastal zone management policy
since its initial implementation, was absorbed by DHEC. This administrative body
became merely a division in a larger state agency; it did not even have final decisionmaking authority. This change indicated a move toward the interests of property owners.
South Carolina’s first three attempts at coastal regulation were not a natural
evolution of policy. They were based on a series of choices made by legislators. A
comparison to North Carolina’s policy illustrates this conclusion. In several ways, South
Carolina’s program is similar to North Carolina’s. First, both have experienced periods
of contentiousness, though North Carolina’s battles primarily occurred during the initial
legislative process. As initially enacted, both launched a new agency for the
administration of their programs. Both states made the decision to move away from, and
eventually ban, hard coastal defenses, and each passed provisions that sought dune
protection. Finally, both coastal zone management policies center on permits and
permitting decisions as the primary vehicle for controlling unwise siting and
development.
More significant are the differences between the two programs. North Carolina’s
administrative agency can regulate a much broader area, due to how it defined its coastal
zone. Whereas North Carolina focused on the type of activity when considering whether
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or not a permit will be issued, South Carolina focused more on where the development
will occur, i.e.—what type of environment will be affected/effect on critical areas. The
implication in this comparison, therefore, is that South Carolina’s primary concern was in
limiting construction and development in certain areas, particularly those in close
proximity to the beach and its associated erosion zones. This conclusion made the 1990
amendments to the BMA much more difficult to grasp, as they seemed to undermine the
entire thrust of the state’s policy. It does, however, further illuminate the difficulty of
writing and implementing environmental regulations that are amenable to citizens. In
this case, significant portions of the population (coastal property owners generally) and
vocal portions of the population (developers and commercial property owners) were
unhappy with how their property was regulated. As a result, the regulation was revised.
While this change was probably not the best thing for the coast as a whole, or even for
the property owners in the long term, it satisfied most of the constituents for the short
term.
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Conclusions
“In the final analysis, the long-range public good is the same as the long-range
private good. If the dry sand beaches of this State disappear because of the failure
of its people and governmental natural resource managers to protect the
beach/dune system, future generations will never have the opportunity to use and
enjoy this valuable resource.”
--South Carolina Coastal Council
Regulations for Permitting in Critical Areas of the State’s Coastal Zone
(May 1991)

As regulatory historian Thomas McCraw has noted, “almost nobody ever declares
his hostility to the ‘public interest.’”289 Still, as Samuel Hays, environmental historian,
has argued, many groups became increasingly frustrated and antagonistic toward what
they considered to be “environmental roadblocks to their goals and objectives.”290 This is
the crux of the coastal zone management conflict of interest: everyone, in theory, wants
to protect the coastal zone and its resources, yet most private property owners want to be
free to develop their property as they see fit with no input from the government and no
restrictions through regulations. The coastal zone has much to offer, in terms of
aesthetics, recreation, scientific research and observation and potential economic benefits.
Because there are so many competing interests that desire to use and benefit from the
coastal zone, conflicts have been associated with its regulation. In South Carolina, the
number of people who live in the coastal zone, in addition to the amount of money that
depends on coastal tourism, has exacerbated this discord.
While the coastal zone management regulation went the way of environmental
regulation generally in its formative years, it has proved, in some ways, more enduring
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than other varieties of regulation. In the early 1980s, the Reagan administration spent
considerable effort to curb environmental regulation. As Hays has observed, though, the
CZMA proved somewhat more difficult to modify than some other statutes.291 This is
likely because, as the initial Senate support for the law indicated, money given to the
states is hard to take away. The CZMA remains a part of the governing legislation that
affects the coastal zone in the twenty-first century and has changed little. In the United
States, both public and private sectors influence the formation of coastal zone policy.
Additionally, all three levels of government, federal, state and local, are involved in
writing and administering coastal zone management policies. The CZMA is the most
prominent federal statute affecting the coastal zone, though there are several others that
impact it. Though enacted during the early 1970s with many other federal environmental
statutes, the CZMA is different in that state participation is completely voluntary. Local
regulation usually comes in the form of zoning ordinances or subdivision regulations.292
The private sector can play a strong role in determining the character of regulation that is
passed in relation to the coastal zone and in terms of the environment generally. This can
be a good thing and has created stronger environmental legislation in some cases. An
example of this public participation can be seen in the mass passage of environmental
regulation in the early 1970s. Alternatively, the public can emphasize other rights that
conflict with environmental mandates, in turn weakening environmental laws. This is
one of the factors that worked to dilute South Carolina’s coastal zone management
legislation in the early 1990s.
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The flexibility of the CZMA was one of its biggest assets and one of its biggest
downfalls. While it permitted states and localities to design plans that best fit their
ecological and economic conditions, it also allowed for inadequate, even deficient,
regulations since only base requirements need be met. As marine scientists John and
Winona Vernberg have noted, “the most rigorous requirement that a state must meet is
that its program strikes a balance between development and the environment.”293 Each
state decided how much or how little it wants to regulate its coastal resources. In the case
of South Carolina, a once strong management program was weakened with no federal
ramifications.
According to the writings of geologists Roger Charlier and Christian DeMeyer,
the principal objectives of coastal management are to avoid development in areas
susceptible to flooding, to ensure that natural systems continue to operate, and to protect
human lives, property and economic activities. As a result, these authors contend, a
successful program should give “full consideration to ecological, cultural, historic and
aesthetic values and to the needs for human safety and economic development.”294 As a
review of South Carolina’s policy has indicated, this is a difficult balance to achieve,
especially considering that safety and ecology are often at odds with development and
economics.
The Beachfront Management Act was a response to a growing threat to a $3
billion industry in South Carolina—tourism. If beaches disappeared or became
drastically degraded in terms of quality and/or accessibility, the state’s profitable tourism
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industry would suffer an enormous loss. Therefore, the program was refitted around the
concepts of retreat (via the setback provisions) and elimination of erosion control
structures. This legislation was aggressive and proactive, and it reflected modern
scientific principles and ideas. As sustainability professor Timothy Beatley has noted,
the 1988 revisions “represented a major and significant expansion of the state’s control
over coastal development.”295 These amendments were necessary since, as Justice Harry
Blackmun noted in his dissenting opinion in Lucas, “the 1977 critical area was relatively
narrow.”296 It did not, however, take into account the naïveté of coastal property owners
in terms of governmental regulation, nor did it consider the financial implications for
these citizens.
One of the key aspects of the BMA was to move away from hard defenses of the
shoreline and toward soft defenses, especially beach renourishment. While definitely
preferable to erosion control devices such as seawalls, renourishment is also not a perfect
solution. Renourished beaches do not have a good record of longevity.297
Renourishment is, in short, always a work in progress. After Hurricane Hugo, for
example, South Carolina spent approximately $6.6 million in renourishment projects on a
forty-five mile strip of beaches. Two years before Hugo, Myrtle Beach spent $5 million
renourishing its beach; one third of the 53,000 truckloads of sand brought in by Myrtle
Beach in that effort disappeared after Hugo.298 This is an indication of one of the
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problems with coastal zone management: even the best available solutions are not
perfect.
One of the positive features of South Carolina’s coastal zone management policy
was protection of dunes. South Carolina addressed this matter from the beginning in its
coastal zone management planning. The “dune system” was recognized as part of the
legislatively defined “critical area.”299 As a result, it was protected from any utilization
without a permit.300 Additionally, the destruction of dune vegetation seaward of the
setback line was prohibited unless there was no feasible alternative; when that was
determined to be the case, new vegetation was required to be planted wherever
possible.301 Dunes are an invaluable element in protecting property that lies behind the
beach. During Hurricane Hugo, for example, Litchfield-by-the-Sea (a private
condominium community located between Murrell’s Inlet and Mt. Pleasant) was
protected by artificial dunes that were twenty feet tall and more than eighty feet wide.
Structures behind the dunes received only modest damage, though one and half dunes
were washed away.302
When South Carolina’s setback provisions were created, they were designed with
flexibility to accord with the variable nature of the South Carolina’s shoreline. Because
some beaches were accreting while others were rapidly eroding, the standard had to be a
dynamic one so that all the beaches could be appropriately accommodated and so that
development could proceed where possible. The setback line was tied to local conditions
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and the local erosion rate, thereby accounting for the natural variation in shoreline trends
among beaches.303
As has been noted by coastal zone management authorities, coastal erosion, while
a natural process that is the result of many complex interactions within nature, is
furthered by the actions of man.304 Although winds, tides, changes in sea-level and
hurricanes affect the rate and nature of coastal erosion, so too do construction of hard
defenses, improvement of inlets, dredging for sand and construction of other structures
near the shoreline and dune systems. There would be no “erosion problem” without
human development. Erosion is a natural, ongoing process of the coastal zone. It has
only become problematic because human beings have built structures too close to the
shoreline.305 That being said, it is unlikely that people will end beachfront construction,
even if it is obviously unwise. Therefore, policies for coastal development should guide
development so that it can be as prudent as possible considering the hazards of
development in this area as well as the sensitivity of the area. While ending coastal
erosion and shoreline retreat is generally acknowledged to be impossible (except,
perhaps, by owners of property adjacent to the shoreline), coastal planners have strived to
restore areas in danger and reduce the rate of erosion.306
Coastal storms, and especially hurricanes in the case of South Carolina, have had
dramatic effects on the shoreline and coastal zone as a whole. Hurricanes have affected
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the shape of the shoreline, size of dunes and rate of erosion. Extremely accelerated rates
of erosion have occurred during hurricanes. Additionally, shoreline and other coastal
zone development have been damaged or completely destroyed if struck by a hurricane,
depending largely on their location in relation to the shoreline. One of the primary
factors associated with hurricane damage is storm surge, which can combine with high
waves and strong winds to produce elevated damage levels in the coastal zone.
Table Five307
Damage in the United States Resulting from Hurricanes
Decade
1900-1910

Damage
In Billions of 1990 Dollars
Less than 1 billion

1911-1920

Less than 1 billion

1921-1930

1.5 billion

1931-1940

4.5 billion

1941-1950

4.5 billion

1951-1960

11 billion

1961-1970

17 billion

1971-1980

18 billion

1981-1990

15 billion

Before the Hugo and Lucas-driven changes, South Carolina’s coastal zone
management program was described by some experts as the strongest in the country. It
was compared favorably to North Carolina and Florida, two progressive and effective
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schemes.308 The New York Times referred to the BMA, prior to the changes motivated by
Hugo and Lucas, as “one of the country’s most stringent laws aimed at discouraging
oceanfront construction.”309 The passage of the BMA was a response to directed research
and investigation into how the coast could best be protected. The measures were strong
but seem to have been a well-intentioned effort by the legislature to do the right thing for
South Carolina’s beaches. Because these types of laws were still in the early stages
everywhere, South Carolina had little to use by way of a model, and it would have been
difficult for them to predict the opposition that the BMA was to engender.
Hurricane Hugo amplified and enhanced opposition to the BMA and directly
resulted in changes to the law made in the summer of 1990. As characterized by Cornelia
Dean of the New York Times, South Carolina “caved in to the pleas of property owners”
after Hugo; the state changed, and fundamentally weakened, its provisions regarding
construction in the coastal zone.310 This opposition was lent support by the first trial
court decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, which awarded the plaintiff
damages as a result of the regulatory taking of his property through the provisions of the
BMA. This decision seemed to indicate that the original version of the BMA could result
in financial consequences for the state and served as an additional argument against these
provisions by developers and private property owners who hoped to see the regulations
modified or eliminated.

308

Christopher L. Brooks, “State Perspective in Coastal Zone Management,” in Sustainable Development
in the Southeastern Coastal Zone, ed. F. John Vernberg, Winona B. Vernberg and Thomas Siewicki
(Columbia: The University of South Carolina Press, 1996), 25-30 ,28.
309
Iver Peterson, “The Public-Private Clash Over Beaches,” The New York Times, October 15, 1989.
310
Dean, Against the Tide, 189.

115

In addition to preserving the coastal zone for ecological and scenic reasons, there
are other rationales for strong coastal zone management polices. First, unwise siting and
coastal development can have consequences in terms of human lives. Hurricane Hugo,
for example, caused twenty-nine deaths in South Carolina alone.311 Second, the cost of
rebuilding these poorly sited structures usually does not fall on the property owner who
built there with knowledge of the consequences; in many cases, taxpayers cover these
costs. As noted by John Weingart, chief of the Department of Environmental
Protection’s Division of Coastal Resources, “public resources are invariably called upon
to rescue private property when the coast is scoured by a serious storm, and taxpayers are
asked to help pay for new roads, sewers, electric utilities and other services for some of
the wealthiest….”312 Structures sited unwisely close to the shoreline will inevitably be
destroyed or broken apart by hurricanes; this debris can, in turn, damage other structures.
Additionally, private development often has the effect of closing of public, or seemingly
public, beaches to other potential users.
As regulatory historian Cary Coglianese has written, “There will always be
friction between environmentalism and capitalism. An economy that rests on private
ownership of land (conferring more privilege than responsibility), on ‘healthy growth’
(the magic words), and on profits now (never mind the cost to the grandchildren), is one
that strains the laws of both nature and ethical society. When dollars are the goal, uses of
nature’s bounty too easily become abuses.”313 This friction is evident when considering
311
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the history of coastal zone management in South Carolina. The state’s best efforts at
creating a strong and effective regulatory program to protect its beaches were defeated by
citizens who valued their property rights above environmental protection. In the short
term, this means that property owners can build houses or commercial buildings like
hotels closer to the ocean. In the long term, this likely means that there will be little or no
beach to draw tourists to South Carolina at some point in the future.
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Appendix One
Federal Agencies and Legislation Affecting the Coastal Zone314

Legislation
Federal Flood Control
Acts

Agency
U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers

Clean Air Act

Clean Water Act

E.P.A.
(Environmental
Protection Agency)
E.P.A.

Flood Insurance Act,
Flood Disaster
Protection Act

FEMA
(Federal Emergency
Management Agency)

Coastal Barrier
Resources Act

National Park Service

Endangered Species Act

U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service

Marine Mammal
Protection Act

National Marine
Fisheries Service

314

Activities Implicating the Coastal
Zone
Involved in wetlands permitting;
provides assistance in beach
nourishment and navigable waters
dredging
Establishes effluent standards for
air pollutants
Involved in wetlands permitting;
involved in coastal pollution
control; establishes effluent
standards for water pollutants
Implements National Flood
Insurance Program; provides preand post-disaster relief to coastal
states and to local governments in
coastal areas
Maintains and manages national
seashores; oversees Coastal Barrier
Resources System
Enforces federal wildlife and
endangered species laws; maintains
national wildlife refuges
Manages fisheries; involved in
marine mammal protection

Adapted from Beatley, Brower and Schwab, An Introduction to Coastal Zone Management.
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Appendix Two
Lucas Timeline and Holdings
Date
1986

Court/Legislation
Original coastal zone legislation in
force

1988

BMA amended

1989
1990

Charleston County Court of
Common Pleas
BMA amended

1991

South Carolina Supreme Court

6/29/1992

Supreme Court of the United States

11/20/1992

South Carolina Supreme Court

1993

Private Settlement

119

Holding/Outcome
Lucas purchases lots which are
not subject to permit
requirements
Lucas can not build on lots due
to new permit requirements
Lucas awarded damages
Lucas may seek special permit
to build on lots
Ruling of trial court reversed;
no taking found; regulation
deemed in prevention of
harmful or noxious uses.
South Carolina Supreme Court
reversed; regulatory taking
found based on loss of all
economic value; case remanded
for determination of common
law basis of regulation.
No common law basis for
restricting Lucas’s use of
property; remanded to trial
court for determination of
temporary takings damages.
$1,575,000.00 paid to Lucas by
South Carolina; lots auctioned
by state.
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